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SIX CONSERVATIVES IN SEARCH OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE REVEALING CASE OF NUDE
DANCING
VINCENT BLASI*

If we think to regulate printing, thereby to rectify manners,
we must regulate our recreations and pastimes, all that is
delightful to man. No music must be heard, no song be set or
sung, but what is grave and Doric. There must be licensing
dancers, that no gesture, motion, or deportment be taught our
youth but what by their allowance shall be thought honest ....
. . . . Im'f)Unity and remissness, for certain, are the bane of a
commonwealth; but here the great art lies, to discern in what
the law is to bid restraint and punishment, and in what things
persuasion only is to work.
If e'/Jery action which is good or evil in man at ripe years
were to be under pittance, and prescription, and com'f)Ulsion,
what were virtue but a name, what praise could be then due to
well-doing, what grammercy to be sober, just, or continent?
-John Milton, Areopagitica (1644)1

I.

INTRODUCTION

The future of political freedom in the United States hardly

* Corliss Lamont Professor of Civil Liberties, Columbia University School of Law.
B.A., Northwestern, 1964; J.D., University of Chicago, 1967. The author is indebted to
Eben Moglen, Henry Monaghan, and Richard Pildes for valuable criticisms and suggestions, and to the Samuel Rubin Program at Columbia Law School and the Institute of
Bill of Rights Law at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and
Mary for research support.
1. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA AND OF EDUCATION 33, 35 (Michael Davis ed., 1967)
(1644).
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turns on whether women have a First Amendment right to dance
in the nude in bars and peep shows. The future of artistic freedom
is perhaps implicated by this question, but only if the law's
demand for general principle prohibits judges from treating expressive nudity in those environments as fundamentally different
from expressive nudity in ballet performances, museum exhibitions, and films. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 2 is an interesting
and potentially important case not because of the significance of
the specific issue it decided, but because it provoked a lively
debate among several articulate judicial conservatives. By looking closely at that debate, we may discern some of the themes
and tensions that will be played out as the First Amendment
enters a period of conservative dominance of the federal judiciary.
Between 1937 and 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed seven Justices to the Supreme Court.3 As a result of
this rapid change of personnel, the Court seemed dangerously
monolithic. Its dialogue on. the great constitutional issues of the
day ran the risk of becoming impoverished due to the lack of
ideological diversity.
Of course, nothing of the sort happened. The Court of the
1940's and 1950's was deeply divided, probably fractious to a
fault. The divisions of those years produced a clash of judicial
philosophies that continues to set the terms of modern constitutional debate.4

2. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
3. Justice Black joined the Court in 1937, Justice Reed in 1938, Justices Frankfurter
and Douglas in 1939, Justice Murphy in 1940, and Justices Byrnes and Jackson in 1941.
WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW app. A (7th ed. 1991).
4. Regarding interpretation of the First Amendment, see, for example, Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (upholding statute forbidding group libels by five-to-four vote);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding statute that criminalized revolutionary speech by six-to-two vote); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949)
(invalidating statute forbidding speech that caused breach of the peace by five-to-four
vote); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating
statute requiring pledge of allegiance in schools by six-to-three vote); Bridges v. California,
314 U.S. 252 (1941) (reversing contempt convictions related to newspaper articles by fiveto-four vote). Regarding the rights of the accused, see, for example, Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46 (1947) (upholding statute allowing court and counsel to comment on accused's
failure to testify by five-to-four vote); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942) (holding that
state need not provide defense counsel in every criminal case by six-to-three vote),
overruled fry Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Regarding the separation of
church and state, see, for example, Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding program
that released public school pupils to attend religious classes constitutional by six-to-three
vote); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding reimbursements for busing
expenses of parochial school students by five-to-four vote).
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With the resignation of Justice Thurgood Marshall and his
replacement by Justice Clarence Thomas, we now have a Supreme Court that looks just as monolithic as the Court of 1941.
Republican presidents appointed all but one of the sitting Justices.
Many of those appointments were made with careful and explicit
attention to the ideological predispositions of the appointee. For
the first time since 1876, no committed civil libertarian sits on
the Court.s
Will the Supreme Court of the 1990's achieve the unity of
purpose and vision that eluded its New Deal predecessor? Or
will the next chapter of the Court's history be shaped by emer-

5. The first Justice John Marshall Harlan joined the Court in 1877. He is best known
for his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552-o4 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting),
but he also wrote important dissenting opinions urging considerably broader interpretations of the freedom of the press and the rights of the accused than were acceptable to
his colleagues. See, e.g., Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463-65 (1907) !Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 538-58 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Harlan's tenure on the Court overlapped with that of Justice Oater Chief Justice) Charles
Evans Hughes, whose landmark majority opinions in Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697,
701-38 (1931); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 279-87 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 356-65 (1937); and Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 447-53 (1938), elevated the civil
liberties perspective from a dissenting point of view to an authoritative interpretation
of the Constitution. Hughes left the Court Oater to return) the same year that Justice
Louis Brandeis joined it. Brandeis's magisterial opinions in cases such as Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-85 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), did much to enhance the
American legal culture's regard for human rights. Brandeis, in turn, served with the
First Amendment's foremost champion on the Court, Justice Hugo Black, whose tenure
overlapped with that of Justices Brennan and Marshall. Some might contend that Justices
Stevens and Blackmun of the contemporary Court deserve to be called civil libertarians.
Compared to their brethren, these two Justices have been relatively receptive to civil
liberties claims, but not with the same consistency, range, devotion, or vision that
characterized the work of the Justices mentioned above. Concerning the rights of the
accused, Justice Blackmun has often read the provisions of the Bill of Rights narrowly.
See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1984-91 (1991) (upholding warrantless
search of container in automobile over Marshall's dissent); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,
714-24 (1975) (permitting evidence obtained in violation of the requirements of Miranda
v. Arizona to be used for impeachment purposes, over dissents by Brennan and Marshall).
Justice Stevens has frequently taken a narrow view of the freedom of speech. See, e.g.,
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 436-39 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing flag
burning as conduct rather than protected expression); Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 46785 (1987) (upholding the authority of the United States Government to classify certain
films of foreign origin as "political propaganda" for the purpose of imposing registration
and labelling requirements); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 728-52 (1978) (upholding
FCC order prohibiting "indecent" broadcast). On civil liberties issues, the opinions of
Justices Blackmun and Stevens tend to be qualified and situation-specific; their rhetoric
tends to be restrained. They are judges who give civil liberties claims careful and
sympathetic consideration, but they are not forceful advocates of the civil liberties
perspective in the way that Justices Harlan, Hughes, Brandeis, Black, Brennan, and
Marshall (as well as several others) were.
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ging divisions in the conservative philosophy of constitutional
interpretation? On many issues, including some of the most
politically divisive and intellectually difficult, there is every reason to expect the new conservative Court to rule decisively and
dramatically, unhampered by dissenting voices or divergent rationales. Conservatives on the Court are likely to agree on narrow
readings of the Fourth, 6 Eighth,7 and Ninth Amendments, 8 and
on an expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment regarding
the issue of affirmative action.9 There is a distinct possibility
that the conservative Justices may achieve a unity of understanding in favor of a broad reading of the Tenth Amendment.10
One can be much less confident in predicting what the triumph
of conservatism portends for the First Amendment, particularly
the clauses that guarantee the freedoms of speech, press, and
assembly. For there are tensions in conservative thought that
have important implications for the various rights of free expression. Some of those tensions are revealed in the way six
prominent, unusually intelligent judicial conservatives, two on
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and four on the
Supreme Court, grappled with the seemingly trivial yet philosophically challenging and doctrinally complex question of whether
a state's prohibition of public nudity can be enforced against
topless dancing performed before a paying, willing, and forewarned audience discreetly assembled.

IL

THE FACTS

Indiana's public indecency statute makes it a misdemeanor to
appear in a public place knowingly or intentionally "in a state of
6. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (establishing a restrictive
definition of "seizure"); Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991) (holding that random
"consensual" bus searches are constitutional).
7. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991) (holding that life sentence for
possession of cocaine was not cruel and unusual punishment); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137 (1987) (holding that Eighth Amendment did not prohibit death penalty for participation
in felony resulting in murder).
8. See, e.g., Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that
various restrictions on the availability of abortions did not violate the Constitution);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that sodomy statute did not violate
constitutional rights).
9. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding affirmative
action plan unconstitutional under Equal Protection Clause).
10. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 528 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(arguing for broad constitutional protection of states' rights); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 580-89 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing for broad
constitutional protection of states' rights).
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nudity." 11 The statute contains a detailed definition of "nudity":
"Nudity" means the showing of the human male or female
genitals, pubic area, or buttocks with less than a fully opaque
covering, the showing of the female breast with less than a
fully opaque covering of any part of the nipple, or the showing
of covered male genitals in a discernibly turgid state. 12

The law forbids not only common forms of public indecency such
as streaking, mooning, and lewd exhibitionism, but also by its
terms appears to prohibit a woman from appearing in public in
a see-through blouse. Neither the statute nor the Indiana case
law specifies what a fully clothed male must do to avoid criminal
liability should his genitals become discernibly turgid in a public
place. Would he satisfy the mens rea element of the crime by
remaining in the public place, or would it be a defense that he
tried his best to forestall, and indeed was distressed by, his
physiological reaction?
The Indiana Supreme Court declined several opportunities to
construe the statute narrowly to avoid possible constitutional
problems. State v. Baysinger13 reversed a lower court determination that the public indecency statute was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.14 Explicitly rejecting the course taken by
its counterparts in Arizona and Oregon, the Indiana Supreme
Court refused to define public place "to exclude places where
persons willingly enter." 15 Instead, the court interpreted the
prohibition on public nudity to extend to "'any place where the
public is invited and are free to go upon special or implied
invitation-a place available to all or a certain segment of the
public.' "16 In the same decision, the justices acknowledged that
some forms of public nudity within the literal reach of the statute,
such as in a play or ballet, might enjoy First Amendment protection.17 Instead of producing a limiting construction of the public
indecency law to take account of this difficulty, however, the
11. IND. CODE § 35-45-4-l(a) (1985).
12. Id. § 35-45-4-l(b).
13. 397 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. 1979), aweal dismissed sub nom. Clark v. Indiana, 446 U.S.
931, and aweal dismissed sub nom. Dove v. Indiana, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
14. Id. at 587.
15. Id. at 585.
16. Id. at 583 (quoting Peachey v. Boswell, 167 N.E.2d 48, 56-57 (Ind. 1960)).
17. Id. at 586.
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court simply concluded that the possibility of unconstitutional
applications of the law did not render it substantially overbroad
in violation of the First Amendment.18
The case of Erhardt v. State19 presented another opportunity
to narrow the statute. The defendant was convicted for a dance
performance she gave while competing with seven other women
in the Miss Erotica of Fort Wayne contest held at the Cinema
Blue Theatre.20 The event was held before a paying audience and
consisted of a question-and-answer session, a bathing suit contest,
and a dance competition.21 During the second of the two songs
to which she danced, the defendant removed her negligee and
panties and "completed her performance wearing a g-string and
scotch tape criss-crossed over her nipples." 22 The Indiana Court
of Appeals dismissed the prosecution, holding that "nonobscene
nude dancing performed in an enclosed theatre for the entertainment of paying spectators, all as occurred here, is presumptively
protected as expression under the First Amendment."23 The
Indiana Supreme Court reversed, however, and reinstated the
conviction, endorsing a dissent in the court below which concluded
that the defendant's conduct fell within the statute's prohibition
and that she had waived her right to raise a constitutional
objection to her conviction. 24 Because the defendant clearly had
raised the issue of statutory interpretation, the Court necessarily
ruled that Indiana's public indecency law extends to a nonobscene
dance in a theatre before a paying audience performed with the
minimal amount of clothing with which the defendant was adorned.
Against the background of these state supreme court decisions,
two actions were filed in federal court seeking to enjoin the
State of Indiana from enforcing its public indecency law against
nude dancing performances in a bar and in an adult bookstore.25

18. Id. at 587.
19. 463 N.E.2d 1121 (Ind. Ct. App.), rev'd, 468 N.E.2d 224 (Ind. 1984).
20. Id. at 1122.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1126.
24. Erhardt v. State, 468 N.E.2d 224, 225 (Ind. 1984).
25. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of S. Bend, 726 F. Supp. 728 (N.D. Ind. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Pearson, 802 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1986), and on remand,
Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414 (N.D. Ind. 1988). The cases were
consolidated, along with a third case, Diamond v. Civil City of South Bend, Civ. No. S85722 (N.D. Ind. 1985), which was not appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
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The Kitty Kat Lounge and its dancer, Darlene Miller, claimed a
First Amendment right to present nude go-go dancing on a stage
to music from a juke box in an enclosed setting in which alcoholic
beverages were being sold.26 Ms. Miller was not paid a set wage
for her performances but rather received a 100% commission on
the first sixty dollars in drink sales during her performance.27
She described her activity as "just entertaining, just dancing." 28
Only one of the four dances she performed was choreographed.29
The district court found that the "avowed purpose of her dance
is to try to get customers to like her so that they will buy more
drinks later,"30 and that "Ms. Miller wants to dance nude because
she believes she would make more money doing so." 31 The state
conceded that Ms. Millei:'s dance performances were not obscene
under prevailing constitutional standards.32
An adult bookstore and entertainment center, Glen Theatre,
claimed a constitutional right to present live nude dancing in an
enclosed setting in which books were sold and films wera shown.33
The dancers performed behind glass panels and customers could
view them by sitting in a booth and inserting coins in a timing
mechanism.34 The plaintiff sought to enjoin prosecution for nude
dances scheduled to be performed by Ms. Gayle Ann Marie Sutro,
an experienced entertainer who had performed nationwide and
who also could be seen in a film showing in the area.35 The
district court found that "Sutro is a professional actress, stunt
woman and ecdysiast ... and has danced, modeled and acted
professionally for more than fifteen years and is a current member in good standing of the Screen Actors Guild, the Screen
Extras Guild and AFTRA [the American Federation of Television

26. Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of S. Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 420 (N.D. Ind. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), and rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct.
2456 (1991).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1091 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
30. Gum Theatre, 695 F. Supp. at 420.
31. Id.
32. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 829 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991).
33. Glen Theatre, 695 F. Supp. at 415, 420.
34. Id. at 419.
35. Id. at 420.
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and Radio Artists]."36 Ms. Sutro's affidavit stated that her dances
were choreographed and were "an attempt to communicate as
well as to entertain." 37 The State conceded that the dances Ms.
Sutro was scheduled to perform were not legally obscene.38
III.

THE BACKGROUND

The First Amendment issue posed by the prohibition of topless
dancing reached the United States Supreme Court at an opportune time. The ascendancy of legal conservatism generated by a
decade of centrally managed, ideologically screened appointments
to the federal bench has given renewed impetus to the claim that
the enforcement of morals is a legitimate function of law. The
political mobilization of moralists over issues such as abortion,
obscenity, and homosexuality has had a carry-over effect that
has helped to focus public attention on the full spectrum of sexual
practices and attitudes. Some prominent feminists have challenged the premises of libertarianism from the left, claiming that
many forms of erotic display and depiction cause serious harm
to women.39 Recently, traditional liberals were provoked and
energized when conservative efforts to enforce morality strayed
outside the confines of sleazy settings and extended to critically
acclaimed museum exhibitions and government funding for avantgarde theatre.40
In intellectual as well as political circles, the regulation of
topless dancing raises issues that resonate. One of the best
articulated, most intelligent debates of modern legal scholarship
is that between Lord Patrick Devlin41 and Professor H.L.A. Hart42

36. Id. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW lNTERNA TIONAL DICTIONARY 718 (Philip Babcock Grove
ed., 1986) defines an "ecdysiast" as a "stripteaser" and "ecdysis" as "the act of molting
or shedding an outer cuticular layer (as in insects and crustaceans)."
37. Glen Theatre, 695 F. Supp. at 420.
38. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 887 F.2d 826, 829 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 904 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991).
39. The feminist critique of pornography and the political action engendered by that
critique are chronicled in DONALD ALEXANDER DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY
(1989).
40. The controversy surrounding museum exhibitions of the disturbing, graphic photography of Robert Mapplethorpe and the effort by Senator Jesse Helms to restrict
federal funding for the arts is described in Stephen F. Rohde, Art of the State: Congres·
sional Censorship of the National Endowment for the Arts, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 353, 358-73, 393-94 (1990).
41. See generally PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965) (arguing that
laws must embody morals if society is to survive).
42. See generally H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963) (arguing against
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regarding the proper role of law in the enforcement of morality.
Among the most balanced, comprehensive, and rigorous treatises
of recent times is Professor Joel Feinberg's four-volume The
Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, 43 which discusses the enforcement of morals in the context of an elaborate, careful taxonomy
of the various interests served by the criminal law. The high
quality of the Hart-Devlin debate and the spotlight east on the
issue of the regulation of homosexuality by the Supreme Court's
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick 44 have spurred a large number of
legal scholars and philosophers to explore the justifications for
and proper limits on the enforcement of morality. 45 Seldom has
the Court addressed a constitutional question with a more impressive-both in quantity and quality-body of scholarship upon
which to draw.
The decision in Bowers adds interest to the Court's confrontation with the constitutional claims of topless dancers for another
reason. Despite the difficulty of the issue and the sophistication
of the academic literature, in Bowers the Justices did not produce
· thoughtful opinions on the question whether the enforcement of
morals is a legitimate basis for limiting individual liberty. The
majority opinion, upholding state authority to prohibit homosexual relations, emphasized the absence of a specific textual basis
for the claim that sexual freedom enjoys even prima faeie eon-

legal enforcement of morality); H.L.A. Hart, Social SolUa:rity and the Enforcement of
Morality, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1967) (arguing that society would not disintegrate absent
the enforcement of a common morality).
43. JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (1986);
JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS (1984).
44. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
45. See, e.g., WALTER BERNS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 188-228 (1976) (criticizing the Court for underenforcing morality); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 241-50 (1990) (discussing inevitability of legislating
morals); HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY (1969) (arguing for some
censorship of obscenity); FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING, supra note 43, at 39-175
(arguing against strict legal moralism); BASIL MITCHELL, LAW, :FiIORALITY, AND RELIGION
IN A SECULAR SOCIETY (1967) (discussing Hart and Devlin); Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin
and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966) (criticizing the enforcement of the
moral consensus); Raymond D. Gastil, The Moral Right of the Majority to Restrict Obscenity
and Pornography Through Law, 86 ETHICS 231 (1976) (arguing that a majority has a moral
right to regulate obscenity and pornography); Graham Hughes, Morals and the Criminal
Law, 71 YALE L.J. 662 (1962) (criticizing Lord Devlin's theories of enforcing morals); C.L.
Ten, Enforcing a Shared Morality, 82 ETHICS 321 (1972) (arguing against enforcing a
shared morality). Two of the classic works of nineteenth century political theory, John
Stuart Mill's ON LIBERTY (1859) and James Fitzjames Stephen's LIBERTY, EQUALITY,
FRATERNITY (1873), deal in large part with the enforcement of morals.
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stitutional protection. 46 The dominant theme of the opinion was
the impropriety of recognizing novel unenumerated rights. By
contrast, the claim in Glen Theatre that morals enforcement is
an inappropriate basis for limiting textually recognized liberties
presented the Court with an occasion to think harder about the
issues raised by the Hart-Devlin debate. The topless dancers
claimed to be exercising an enumerated constitutional right: they
invoked not the Ninth Amendment but the First.
In this regard also the topless dancing case reached the Supreme Court at an interesting time. One of the questions raised
by the emerging conservative dominance on the Court is whether
the freedom of speech will continue to occupy a special place
among constitutional liberties, and if so, what form that special
regard will take. The Court has long since rejected the absolutist
claim that no restrictions on speech are permissible, but has
nonetheless developed an elaborate set of doctrines that subjects
most efforts to regulate speech to unusually demanding standards
of justification.
The famous clear-and-present-danger test is an example. Under
the modern formulation of the test, adopted in Brandenburg v.
Okio 47 in 1969 and followed ever since,48 speech cannot be punished on the ground that it may, or even probably will, cause
serious harm in the indefinite future. Only advocacy that is
"directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action" can be the subject of
sanctions.49 This harm principle is restrictive. It reflects the high
place of the freedom of speech in the constitutional order, and a
distrust of regulatory authority grounded in claims of harm that
are necessarily speculative due to the diffuse character of the
harm or the contingent quality of the causal connection. A constitutional jurisprudence that prized speech less than has been
traditional in our legal culture, or that distrusted regulatory
authority less, would permit justifications for the regulation of
speech based on plausible scenarios of delayed or diffuse harm
of the sort invoked by moralists and feminists alike. Some conservative legal scholars have argued specifically that speech can
be restricted when it causes moral as well as material harm, that

46. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191, 195.
47. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
48. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,409 (1989); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927-28 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam).
49. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (footnote omitted).
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the First Amendment does not create an exception to the general
principle that government has constitutional authority to enforce
morality by means of the criminal law.50
The timing of the Glen Theatre litigation helped to sharpen
the issues raised by the case for yet another reason. Perhaps
the most hotly debated contemporary free speech dispute concerns the wisdom and constitutionality of efforts by university
officials, and occasionally by state legislatures, to regulate speech
that is perceived by various groups, particularly women and
members of racial minority groups, to denigrate, intimidate, or
silence their members.51 On this issue, some conservatives challenge on principle the authority of officials to enforce a morality
of personal respect, even as applied to particular instances of
speech that are concededly intemperate, degrading, crude, and
devoid of any kind of rational exposition.52 The First Amendment
is indivisible, these conservatives say, and hate-speech codes
inevitably will be applied indiscriminately. Liberals, on the other
hand, seem more comfortable with the enforcement of morality
in this context, and less concerned about the expansive potential
of the censorial mentality.53 Can a principled conservative approve

50. See, e.g., BERNS, supra note 45, at 188-228; BoRI<, supra note 45, at 241-50.
51. See Kenneth L. Karst, Boundaries and Reasons: Freed.om of Expression and the
Subordinatwn of Groups, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 95 (arguing that mutual communication is
the best way to eliminate racial and sexual biases; therefore, all speech expressing
opinions on these issues should be allowed); Charles R. Lawrence ill, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 437 (supporting the
regulation of racial epithets in certjlin situations not limited to those involving face-toface encounters); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democra.cy, and the First Amendment, 32
WM. & MARY L. REV. 267 (1991) (concluding that the reasons typically given for prohibiting
hate speech are not totally persuasive either in educational communities or in less
specialized settings); Rodney A. Smolla, Rethinlcing First Amendment Assumptions About
Racist and Sexist Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV.171 (1990) (outlining current approaches
to First Amendment concerns about several types of speech and conduct and attempting
to provide permissible controls of several forms of speech); Nadine Strossen, Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (responding to Professor
Lawrence's article, supra, and addressing the general issues involved in regulating campus
hate speech).
52. See, e.g., George F. Will, Liberal Censorship, WASH. POST, Nov. 5, 1989, at C7.
53. See; e.g., Lawrence, supra note 51, at 472-76; Smolla, supra note 51, at 206-09. Few
liberals who support hate-speech regulation would admit that they seek to enforce morality
as an end in itself. Instead, they would describe this type of regulation as designed to
prevent the material harm of intimidation of persons who are, as individuals or members
of identifiable groups, targeted by the hate speech. But conservative moralists also claim
to be victimized when their moral precepts are flouted in public, causing them personal
distress and a diminished ability to inculcate in their children the moral values they hold
dear. The harms of intimidation and silencing that proponents of hate speech regulation
invoke would never satisfy the Brandenburg test, see supra text accompanying note 49,

622

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:611

the enforcement of morals in the context of erotic dancing but
not in the context of group vilification? Can a principled liberal
argue that topless dancing is protected by the First Amendment
but not the shouting of racial epithets? Important differences
between the two categories of speech regulation may exist-hate
speech ordinarily is not confined to settings in which every
member of the audience has made a choice to receive the message,
but hate speech also seems more political in character - but the
response of many conservatives to the hate speech issue at least
suggests that they do not invariably prefer a narrow interpretation of the First Amendment and do not always take a broad
view of the state's power to enforce morality.
As the hate speech issue illustrates, the question of the proper
scope of the state's power to enforce morality often is raised in
conjunction with the question of what counts as "speech" in the
constitutional sense. The ascendancy of conservatives on the
federal bench may yield a conception of speech different from
that which the courts have developed over the last fifty years.
Just as in most contexts conservatives tend to be more concerned
with diffuse harms to the moral fabric than are persons of other
political persuasions, conservatives tend to emphasize qualities
such as excellence, prudence, and civility. 54 The more visceral,
rambunctious, or flamboyant modes of communication may strike
some conservative judges as outside the ambit of First Amendment concern, and thus not entitled to whatever protective doctrines govern disputes over genuine "speech." In an even more
restrictive vein, Robert Bork once claimed that the First Amendment covers only explicitly political speech, that scientific communication and artistic expression enjoy no constitutional
protection whatsoever.55 That position was ridiculed during Judge
Bork's confirmation hearings; Bork himself did not attempt to
defend it before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and none of
his supporters came to his rescue on this point. 56 Yet the impli-

for lack of both specificity and temporal imminence. Recall that Brandenburg itself
involved explicitly racist and antisemitic speech, coupled with threats of "revengeance,"
though the case was decided on the overbreadth of the statute. Brandenburg, 395 U.S.
at 446, 448.
54. See, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 26 (1962) (defining a good
individual as one who cultivates these virtues).
55. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 27-28 (1971).
56. SENATE COMM. OF THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT, s. EXEC. REP. No. 2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 269-77 (1987).
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cations of applying First Amendment principles in the realm of
artistic expression are not easy to contain. If works of art,
presumably including visual art, qualify for constitutional protection, why not artistic dances? Is a painting of a nude displayed
in a museum more entitled to consideration under the First
Amendment than a nude scene in a ballet or opera? And if a
ballerina or a diva can legally disrobe, why not a go-go dancer?
A natural response would be to distinguish varieties of purported artistic expression on the basis of such factors as the
presumed motivation of the dancers and their voyeurs and the
degree to which the activity under review requires training and
skill. Perhaps conservatives who value excellence are more .willing than others to make these kinds of judgments, but they are
judgments that are bound to turn heavily on the personal values
of those who do the judging. In recent years, a central tenet of
conservative constitutional thought has been the paramount responsibility of judges not to render decisions that depend heavily
on their personal values.57 This tension between the quest for
excellence and the fear of judicial subjectivity helps to make the
issue of topless dancing a good test of judicial conservatism.
The conservative critique of judicial subjectivity is implicated
in still another way. One of the complaints raised by conservatives against the liberal constitutional doctrines developed during
the 1960's and 1970's was that the Justices indulged in essentially
"legislative" modes of reasoning, reaching decisions not by enforcing basic, time-honored principles but rather by inventing
and applying elaborate, multifactor tests that bore the stamp of
subjectivity and arbitrariness.58 The multiple levels of scrutiny
that came to be a familiar feature of equal protection doctrine
were cited by some conservatives as an example of judicial
reasoning run amok.59 So too was the three-part test introduced
in Lerrwn v. Kurtzman60 for identifying impermissible establish-

57. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 45, at 251-59; RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE CONST!·
TUTION 99-114 (1990); Lino A. Graglia, How the Constitution Disappeared, in INTERPRETING
THE CONSTITUTION 35, 35-50 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); William H. Rehnquist, The Notion
of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 705-06 (1976); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1989).
58. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the
Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REV. 143, 144, 149, 154
(1964); Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 165-69, 180-82
(1985).
59. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 58, at 166 n.6.
60. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
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ments of religion. 61 Doctrinal complexity was seen by conservatives as an important indicator of judicial illegitimacy. In view
of the troubling analogies that haunt the prohibition of topless
dancing, conservatives addressing the issue faced the challenge
of giving reasons and drawing lines without producing doctrines
as complex and arbitrary as the ones they had spent the last
decade criticizing on just that account.
Finally, a fascinating aspect of the background to Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc. 62 is that the most carefully reasoned Supreme
Court precedent regarding the First Amendment and the enforcement of morality is Cohen v. California,68 in which Justice John
Marshall Harlan, the quintessential judicial conservative, wrote
an opinion for the majority holding unconstitutional a state's
prohibition on the use of profane words in public. Harlan's opinion
relied heavily on the conservative virtue of self-reliance, claiming
that "each of us," not the government, has the responsibility to
develop and abide by norms of permissible language use. 64 He
observed that the defendant's employment of a four letter word
was neither legally obscene nor forced upon a captive audience,65
characteristics shared by the topless dances at issue in Glen
Theatre. That a judge so conservative and so steeped in civility
as Justice Harlan should have found in the First Amendment a
bar against the enforcement of a morality of language illustrates
how difficult it is to identify an orthodoxy of conservative thought
regarding the freedom of speech.
IV.

THE OPINIONS

The Glen Theatre litigation caused judges at all levels of the
federal judiciary to grapple with the various First Amendment
issues raised by Indiana's prohibition of nude dancing. Twelve
different judges published opinions. Although some other opinions
are worthy of study, particularly those written by Judges Flaum
and Coffey in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 66 I shall
examine the opinions written by six judges who have achieved
61. See, e.g., Philip E. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious
Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 825-31 (1984); Nagel, supra note 58, at 166 n.4.
62. 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
63. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
64. Id. at 24.
65. Id. at 20-22.
66. See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1081-89 (7th Cir. 1990) (Flaum,
J.) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); id. at
1104-20 (Coffey, J ., dissenting).
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special prominence as contributors to the conservative philosophy
of constitutional interpretation. A close look at how each of these
judges went about resolving this difficult case may enrich our
understanding regarding what the ascendancy of legal conservatism portends for the freedom of speech.

A. Richard Posner
In the Seventh Circuit, Judges Richard Posner and Frank
Easterbrook, longtime colleagues on the University of Chicago
Law School faculty and leading lights of the law-and-economics
movement,67 engaged in a debate of a quality one rarely encounters in the pages of the law reports. Posner and Easterbrook
share much more than an institutional affiliation and a taste for
economic analysis. Both judges command forensic skills of the
first order. In addition, judging by the erudition displayed in
their opinions in the topless dancing case,68 both men are deeply
interested in and knowledgeable about the performing and visual
arts. Despite their many affinities, the two judges sharply and
passionately disagreed over whether striptease dancing is "speech"
within the meaning of the First Amendment.
Judge Posner focused his analysis on the claim, accepted by
the district court, 69 that a striptease dance is "conduct" rather
than "expressive activity" and hence outside the ambit of First
Amendment concern.70 Posner called this conclusion "indefensible
and a threat to artistic freedom." 71 Perhaps reflecting the conservative economist's unwillingness to employ external criteria
to ascribe differential value to personal preferences, Posner was
at pains in his opinion to avoid letting class bias or aesthetic
evaluation influence his assessment of the legal status of the
dancing at issue. He equated for constitutional purposes Darlene
Miller's nude dancing in the Kitty Kat Lounge in South Bend
with the nude (under Indiana's definition) performance of the

67. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986); Frank H.
Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic
System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
68. Miller, 904 F.2d 1081.
69. See Glen Theatre, Inc. v. Civil City of S. Bend, 695 F. Supp. 414, 419 (N.D. Ind.
1988), rev'd sub nom. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 887 F.2d 826 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111
S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
70. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1092 (Posner, J., concurring).
71. Id. at 1090.
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Dance of the Seven Veils in a recent production of the opera
Salome at the Chicago Lyric Opera.12
One might suppose that a defining feature of legal conservatism
would be the willingness to notice some of the contextual differences between nude dancing in bars and in classical ballet performances. Conservatives pride themselves on their sensitivity
to social context and their distrust of abstractions that lump
together divergent, distinctive phenomena.73 Judge Posner duly
noted the elements of barroom striptease that might cast doubt
on its claim to First Amendment protection:
Because the dancers at the Kitty Kat Lounge are not professional dancers, because three of the four dances were not
choreographed, because the music to which they dance is
canned, and because the dancers sell drinks to the customers
afterward, it is tempting to suppose that the "expressive"
elements of their "performance" are phony-that the dance
and the music are figleaves to conceal the absence of figleaves. 74

But he was not persuaded. He recounted the long and varied
history of striptease dancing from the satyr plays of ancient
Greece to the scandalous performances of Sally Rand, Gypsy
Rose Lee, and Isadora Duncan.75 He found in this history a
refutation of the claim that striptease has more the quality of
sexual encounter than artistic statement:
The striptease was not invented in order to place a cultural
patina on displays of naked women. Of course, there would be
no female stripteases without a prurient interest in the female
body; but that is just to say that there would be no erotic art
without Eros. Though there is no striptease without some
stripping-in today's moral climate, without a great deal of
stripping-the dancing and the music are not distractions from
the main theme, patched on to fool the censor; they are what
make a given fem ale body expressive of a specifically sexual
emotion. The striptease is the ensemble of the music, the dance,
the disrobing, and the nude end state; it is more erotic than

72. Id. at 1103.
73. See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 52-55 (J.G.A.
Pocock ed., 1987) (1790); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 54-70 (1960);
MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, On Being Conservative, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER
ESSAYS 168-96 (1967).
74. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1091 (Posner, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1089-90.
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any of its components; and what makes it more erotic than
the body itself, or the disrobing itself, is, precisely, that it is
expressive of erotic emotion.76
Judge Posner specified what striptease dancing expresses that
mere nudity does not:
[N]udity and disrobing are not invariahly associated with sex.
The goal of the striptease-a goal to which the dancing is
indispensable-is to enforce the association: to make plain that
the performer is not removing her clothes because she is about
to take a bath or change into another set of clothes or undergo
a medical examination; to insinuate that she is removing them
because she is preparing for, thinking about, and desiring sex.77
Having established to his satisfaction that striptease makes a
statement, Posner considered the argument that such dancing "is
not the type of expression that the First Amendment protects,
because it is not the expression of ideas or opinions."78 He
concluded that such a limitation on the scope of the First Amendment would have disturbing implications for the arts:
If the striptease dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge is not
expression, Mozart's piano concertos and Balanchine's most
famous ballets are not expression. This is not to suggest that
striptease dancing is indistinguishable from these other forms
of expression. But they cannot be distinguished on the ground
that a piano concerto and a (nonpantomimic) ballet express
ideas and a striptease expresses emotion. If the concert and
the ballet have meaning-and I do not doubt that there is a
meaningful sense in which they do-so has the striptease.79

Judge Posner reinforced the point with a detailed analysis of
Titian's painting of a voluptuous nude, Venus with a Mirror, on
permanent display in the National Gallery of Art:
We might try to close the gap between the intellectual and
the emotional by saying that the painting expresses a concept
of beauty, of opulence, of balance, and so forth. But among the
"so forth" are feminine sexuality and desirability, and if these

76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 1091-92.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
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are "concepts" in Venus with a Mirror they are "concepts" in
a striptease (or in a Playboy pin-up) in just the same sense.
The striptease version is coarse, unsubtle, "artless," even degraded, but the two works are "conceptual" to the same degree.so
But even if a limiting principle based on the difference between
intellectual and emotional appeal might seem troubling on close
analysis, the nagging objection remains that the First Amendment is somehow debased when interpreted to protect the raw
sexuality of the barroom striptease. Judge Posner confronted
this objection head-on:
One can argue from the text and background of the First
Amendment that the constitutional protection of freedom of
speech is limited to the discursive and the didactic, that nondidactic art should be totally excluded, or at the very least
that low-grade erotic entertainment should be-the Founding
Fathers would writhe in their graves if they knew that the
nude dancers of the Kitty Kat Lounge could enwrap themselves
with the First Amendment.81
For Judge Posner, however, the difficult task of elaborating a
nondiscriminatory First Amendment could not be a voided by
resort to originalism, especially not by em ploying a standard so
unprincipled as whether the framers "would writhe in their
graves":
[O]ne can reply that such arguments merely demonstrate the
inadequacy of original understanding as a guide to constitutional interpretation; that they would if accepted change the
Constitution from a living document into a petrified reminder
of the limits of human foresight; that a conception of free
speech which privileges the burning of the American flag but
permits government to ban performances of twelve-tone music
is more absurd than one that protects flag burning, twelvetone music, and striptease; and that if the purpose and scope
of the First Amendment's speech and press clauses are exhausted in the protection of political speech, because freedom
of political speech is all that is necessary to preserve our
democratic political system, this implies the exclusion from the
amendment's protections not only of all art (other than the

80. Id. at 1094.
81. Id. at 1095.
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political) but also of sci~nce. For one can have democracy
without science, just as one can have democracy without art.82

To fail in the effort to place striptease dancing outside the
ambit of First Amendment concern is not necessarily to conclude
that such dancing is constitutionally immune from regulation. The
State of Indiana argued that even if the striptease is speech in
the First Amendment sense, it can be regulated under the state's
power to enforce morality.83 Judge Posner rejected this contention. His analysis reveals why he had viewed as the central issue
in the case, and had explored at such length, the question whether
nude dancing is the type of expression with which the First
Amendment is concerned at all.
Posner rejected the proposition that as a general matter the
Constitution forbids government from attempting to enforce morality. He put the point forcefully:
·
I do not argue that legislation, to be valid, must have some
empirical basis or serve some utilitarian end. The modern state
is not forbidden to interfere with transactions between consenting, competent adults merely because it is unable to show
that third parties are harmed. The state is free to embody in
legislation the moral opinions of its dominant groups, or for
that matter of any group influential with the legislature-is
free, therefore, to make hostility to nonmarital sex, disgust at
public displays of nudity, revulsion at vulgar erotic entertainment, and embarrassment at public displays of nudity premises
of state action even though it is difficult to ground these
moralistic emotions in pragmatic social concerns.84

Just as the Fourteenth Amendment (or the Ninth Amendment)
does not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics, 85 neither does it
enact John Stuart Mill's On Liberty or H.L.A. Hart's Law, Liberty, and Morality.
·
In Judge Posner's view, however, the balance between individual freedom and state authority shifts once the First Amendment
becomes implicated:
[TJhe state is free to act upon the moral preferences of the
majority only up to the limits set by the federal Constitution.

82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 1096 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1104.
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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Those limits are not the sky when the activity restricted by
state legislation is expressive activity in a sense that I believe
encompasses erotic dance performances in general and the
striptease in particular.86

Posner did not deny Indiana all power to regulate nude dancing.
He surmised that special social harms might be associated with
the barroom setting, as well as special regulatory authority under
the Twenty-First Amendment. 87 But he read the First Amendment to prohibit a state from enforcing in the name of morality
a comprehensive prohibition on striptease dancing without regard
to setting or proven material harm.
Judge Posner did not explain why he considered the enforcement of morality an insufficient basis for limiting First Amendment rights. In contrast to his patient exploration of the proper
scope of First Amendment concern, his rejection of the claim
that speech can be regulated in order to serve moral values was
conclusory. He did not say whether he considered moral justifications for limiting speech too inherently expansive to be reconciled with the purposes of the First Amendment, or whether
he saw in the freedom of speech a commitment to open-ended
moral as well as political evolution.88 It is a weakness of his long,
erudite, and thoughtful opinion that he did not treat Indiana's
claim to enforce its morality even against First Amendment
activities with the same care that he treated the state's claim
that nude dancing is not speech in the First Amendment sense.
One might ask what is distinctively conservative about the
Posner opinion. The proposition that drives his analysis is egalitarian in spirit: vulgar forms of erotic entertainment cannot be
made illegal when much of what we call art is also, in essence,
erotic entertainment for the better educated classes. Egalitarianism is not a value one usually associates with conservatism.89
A close reading of Judge Posner's opinion, however, reveals that

86. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1104 (Posner, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 1102; see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 114-16 (1972). The Twentyfirst Amendment, which ended Prohibition, "has been recognized as conferring something
more than the normal state authority over public health, welfare, and morals." Id. at 114.
88. For an argument about the implications of such a commitment to an open process
for determining the public morality regarding pornography, see T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom
of EX])Tession and Categories of E~ression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 542-50 (1979).
89. For a conservative meditation on the costs of equality, see ROBERT NISBET, TWILIGHT
OF AUTHORITY 194-229 (1975). See also HAYEK, supra note 73, at 85-102 (arguing that
equality of rules is the only kind of equality conducive to liberty).

1992]

SIX CONSERVATIVES

631

his concern for equal treatment in the regulation of erotica
derives from premises that are indeed conservative.
First, conservative economists are generally skeptical about
the capacity of central planners to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, to decide which products provide the most value
to consumers.90 These economists are respectful of the divergent
preferences of different consumers and hesitant to base public
policy on a centralized decision that one product (such as a
particular form of erotic entertainment) has more intrinsic value
for most persons than another product (such as a different form
of erotic entertainment). In this view, preferences revealed in
market behavior provide the best test of consumer value. The
market for barroom and peep show striptease seems robust and
resilient. Consumer preference is not the only factor to be taken
into account-there remain serious questions of external harm,
for example-but conservative economists consider consumer
preference an important starting point for determining social
value.91 Judge Posner no doubt was drawing on his background
as a conservative economist when he wrote: "The Constitution
does not look down its nose at popular culture even if its framers
would have done so."92
Second, the conservative aversion to judicial subjectivity seems
to have played a major role in Judge Posner's analysis. He was
quite willing to make the personal aesthetic judgment that the
striptease dances at issue in the case were performed "with vigor
but without accomplishment.''93 He opined:
Although much of today's high culture began as popular entertainment, the likelihood that the videotape of the Kitty Kat
stripteases will one day achieve the cultural renown of [Manet's
painting including a nude, Dejeuner sur l'herbe, which caused
a scandal when first exhibited] is vanishingly close to zero.
Anyone who doubts this is carrying relativism and skepticism
too far.94

90. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1962). The locus classicus
of this proposition is Lionel Robbins, Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility: A Comment,
48 ECON. J. 635 (1938). See also KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
9 (2d ed. 1963) (remarking on the difficulty of comparing personal utilities).
91. Id.
92. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1098 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (Posner,
J., concurring), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991).
93. Id. at 1091.
94. Id. at 1098.
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But Judge Posner did not believe that aesthetic judgments, his
own or those of other judges, ought to play a role in demarcating
the boundaries of the First Amen~ment:
[A]esthetic quality cannot be the standard that judges use to
determine which erotic performances can be forbidden and
which cannot be. There are no objective standards of aesthetic
quality, and while we allow obscene works to be "redeemed"
by "evidence" of aesthetic quality, it hardly follows that we
should allow works that are not obscene to be condemned on
the basis of evidence suggesting a lack of aesthetic quality. 95

Third, modern conservatives profess a disdain for paternalism,
not only for its inefficiency in economic terms but also for its
adverse effect on character .96 Paternalism can be seen as a feudal
impulse, a practice that engenders passivity, stasis, and hierarchical relationships, and that discourages experimentation and
initiative. This view of the paternalism inherent in censorship
seems to have informed Judge Posner's view of the topless
dancing case:
What kind of people make a career of checking to see whether
the covering of a woman's nipples is fully opaque, as the statute
requires?97
The practical effect of letting judges play art critic and censor
would be to enforce conventional notions of "educated taste,"
and thus to allow highly educated people to consume erotica
but to forbid hoi polloi to do the same. The robust paternalism
and class consciousness that once permitted such a distinction
have lost their legitimacy.9s

As our study of some of the other opinions will show, Judge
Posner certainly did not speak for all conservatives when he
concluded that striptease dancing enjoys the protection of the
First Amendment. His opinion nonetheless represents an effort
to bring conservative values to bear on the resolution of the
issue.

95. Id.
96. See, e.g., CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, HAYEK AND MODERN LIBERALISM 136 (1989) (discuss•
ing Hayek's view that liberty is not valuable for the goal it enables one to reach but
because of the striving and learning it requires).
97. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1100 (Posner, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1098.
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B. Frank Easterbrook
Possibly provoked by Judge Posner's analysis, Judge Frank
Easterbrook devoted most of his opinion to a call for precisely
the kind of line drawing that Posner argued is illegitimate.
Easterbrook saw differences of constitutional significance between barroom striptease and nude ballet. He considered the
First Amendment to be concerned exclusively with the expression
of "ideas," "thoughts," and "messages," not "emotions" as such.99
He disputed Judge Posner's contention that the striptease dances
at issue conveyed a message of eroticism to barroom and peep
show audiences in a manner comparable to the way such a
message might be communicated by serious works of art:
Sophisticates go to the museum and see Renoir's Olympia or
to the opera and see a soprano strip during the Dance of the
Seven Veils in Strauss' Salmne. If the First Amendment protects these expressions, the argument goes, Joe Sixpack is
entitled to see naked women gyrate in the pub. Why does this
follow? That a dance in Salmne expresses something does not
imply that a dance in JR's Kitty Kat Lounge expresses something, any more than the fact that Tolstoy's Anna Karenina
was a stinging attack on the Russian social order implies that
the scratching of an illiterate is likely to undermine the Tsar. 100

In defense of his refusal to draw lines between various forms
of entertainment, Judge Posner had made much of the point that
abstract art and nonprogrammatic music have less of an articulable message than a striptease.101 Posner labelled as "philistine"
the "notion that all art worthy of the name has a 'message.' "102
He could not believe that under the First Amendment
"Beethoven's string quartets are entitled to less protection than
Peter and the Wolf." 103 Drawing on his own considerable knowledge of the fine arts, Judge Easterbrook responded that for all
serious works of art, those in which narrative does not predominate as well those in which it does, there is a message in the
sense required by the First Amendment:
99. Id. at 1125-26 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 1093-94 (Posner, J., concurring).
102. Id. at 1094.
103. Id.
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Bach's Mass in B Minor, Beethoven's Pastoral (Sixth) Symphony, Wagner's Parsifal, Mahler's Resurrection (Second) Symphony, the Beatles' Sergeant Pepper's Lonely Hearts Club Band,
like other vocal, religious, and program music, tell storiessometimes sexually explicit ones, as in Orffs Carmina Burana,
which, if it were not sung in Latin, could not be put on the
airwaves. People may fairly dispute whether absolute music,
such as LaMonte Young's Well-Tuned Piano, communicates
thoughts, but surely it embodies them (the right place for the
major third, etc.); all that we call music is the product of
rational human thought and appeals at least in part to the
same faculties in others....
Like mimes, ballets tell stories, often erotic stories, and
clothing (or lack of it) may help the tale unfold. No one can
miss the sensual message in Stravinsky's Le Sacre Du Printemps or the fairy tale in Tchaikovsky's Nutcracker. Ballet
rarely approaches absolute music in abstraction. Even Balanchine's choreography to Stravinsky's Agon, a model of spare
movement, does not suppress the contest to which the title
refers. People objected to Nijinsky and Isadora Duncan because of the message rather than the medium.104

Easterbrook found no real message in striptease: "Barroom displays are to ballet as white noise is to music."1o5
In contrast to Judge Posner's near hypersensitivity concerning
the perils of cultural elitism, Judge Easterbrook seemed almost
to relish the opportunity to draw lines, "to distinguish serious
art from swill." 106 One might be tempted to read into the
Easterbrook opinion a judicial embrace of what some conservatives would call standards of excellence. The opinion is more
complicated than that. Judge Easterbrook's ambitious effort to
distinguish art from entertainment was at least as much the
product of his concern about excessive judicial power as any
view he may have about popular culture. He did, in fact, say
that he would find the nude scene in the musical Hair to fall
within the protection of the First Amendment.107
For Judge Easterbrook, the obligation to interpret the First
Amendment requires of a judge the willingness to draw lines,
and to do so via the medium of categorical rules. Unless the
ambit of First Amendment concern is demarcated with relative

104. Id. at 1125 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 1126.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1128.
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clarity, and demarcated in a way that excludes the all-embracing
phenomenon of entertainment, courts would wind up evaluating
the reasonableness of all legislative attempts to regulate entertainment. That would be substantive due process reincarnate.
Judges can best prevent its recurrence "by insisting on categorical rules." With characteristic certitude, Judge Easterbrook explained his categorical understanding of the First Amendment:
" 'Conduct' and 'speech' are the principal categories, and observing that distinction is essential if we wish to maintain the boundary between legislative and judicial roles in a democratic
society."108
No doubt referring to the speech-conduct ·distinction among
others, Judge Posner had described the case as presenting "a
symphony of sterile dichotomies." 109 Judge Easterbrook, however,
offered an unapologetic, and indeed both sophisticated and spirited, defense of his dichotomy:
Any sentient being knows that categories are imperfect. Lawyers are trained to disparage line-drawing by showing that no
matter where the line goes you can frame essentially indistinguishable cases on either side. Such a line is nonsensical!,
comes the coupe de grace. The exercise is child's play in the
domain of art and entertainment, for "what is art?" is a
question unanswered for centuries . . . .
Judges who see the many facets of a subject, who know that
just as a line cannot bisect a sphere so no one-dimensional rule
can partition a multi-dimensional world, also must understand
the role lines play in governance and the allocation of functions.110

Easterbrook invoked Holmes in support of this point, and even
produced a good imitation of a Holmesian aphorism: "Complex
reality mocks rules, yet we must deny ourselves the comfort of
requiring the law to match the universe."m
Is a preference for categorical rules truly a conservative position? Historically, conservatives have accused liberals of being
too doctrinaire, too prone to abstraction, too insensitive to the
complexity and ambiguity of the human condition, too inclined to

108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1130.
Id. at 1099 (Posner, J., concurring).
Id. at 1130 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
Id.
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prefer logic over tradition. 112 Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and
Jackson, the leading conservative Justices of the postwar period,
repeatedly criticized their brethren for oversimplifying constitutional issues, for failing to take into account numerous relevant
variables.113 Has the wheel now turned completely?
Judge Easterbrook's call for categorical rules must be understood in the context of the modern conservative hostility to
judicial review .114 For Easterbrook, any departure from categorical rules as a mode of legal analysis is likely to expand the
power of the judiciary, in the case at hand by expanding the
scope of First Amendment coverage. His opinion is replete with
warnings about judicial overreaching:
Concern about the limits of judicial power, about the authority
for an official with life tenure to countermand a decision of
the elected legislature, must be at the forefront in every
constitutional case. . ..
Political society depends on stable lines to govern a world
of continuums. Anything else transfers the locus of power. 115

Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, and Jackson were also deeply interested in limiting the role of the judiciary, but they believed
the way to do that was to take into account the many variables
that might bear on a case, reasoning that a judge aware of the
complexity of a dispute would define his role narrowly. 116 If Judge
Easterbrook is representative, perhaps several decades of accumulated frustration over judicial activism have led modern legal
conservatives to question that judgment and to opt instead for
a more categorical approach to constitutional interpretation.
A second and important example of Judge Easterbrook's reliance on categorical reasoning to limit judicial review is provided
112. See, e.g., MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, Rationalism and Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS
AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 73, at 1-7.
113. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 589-625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13-37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
114. For a striking example of Judge Easterbrook's refusal to hold unconstitutional a
state antitakeover law of a type he had criticized in his scholarship, compare Amanda
Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1989) with Frank H.
Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?, 59
N.Y.U. L. REV. (1984) (arguing that antitakeover mechanisms are detrimental to target
shareholders).
115. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1130 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
116. See cases cited supra note 113.
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by his alternative basis for rejecting the First Amendment claims
of the topless dancers. Even if go-go dancing is speech in the
First Amendment sense, he stated, Indiana can regulate the
activity in the course of enforcing a general prohibition on public
nudity:
Almost the entire domain of Indiana's statute is unrelated to
expression, unless we view nude beaches and topless hot dog
vendors as speech. Unclothed dancing is a tiny fraction of the
ambit of the rule, and what plaintiffs need is an exemption
from a well-justified norm.
Conduct that plays a role in expression is riot exempt from
neutral regulation. 117

This passage echoes a familiar refrain of Justice Scalia, a refrain
the Justice would repeat in his opinion in the Glen Theatre case
in the Supreme Court.118 Judge Easter brook acknowledged his
debt to Scalia on this point.119 Discussion of the general prohibition principle is best postponed until we examine Justice Scalia's
opinion.120
One question of great importance for the future of the First
Amendment under conservative trusteeship was raised but not
really resolved by Judge Easterbrook's endorsement of categorical reasoning. The question is basic: do modern judicial conservatives really believe that the freedom of speech, properly
understood, deserves strong protection against encroachment by
legislatures and officials? Categorical analysis may narrow the
scope of the freedom of speech, but may by the same token
strengthen the protection that is accorded the speech that is
found to be of First Amendment concern. A broader freedom,
determined by a reasoning process that takes account of numerous variables, concerns, and contingencies, is likely to be a more
qualified, diluted freedom. It would not be paradoxical for a
conservative to narrow the scope of the First Amendment out
of a genuine desire to preserve its vitality. Unlike many of their
forbears, modern conservatives do not typically defend privilege
117. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1120 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
118. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-67 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); see also Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23
(D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that laws that proscribe communicative
conduct for reasons unrelated to communication do not violate the First Amendment!,
rev'd sub nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
119. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1121-22 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
120. See infra notes 153-80 and accompanying text.
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or seek a society impervious to change. That part of contemporary conservatism that celebrates the free market in fact places
a premium on such qualities as diversity, independence, dynamism, and adaptability. 121 Historically, the freedom of speech has
fostered those qualities. It is not simply a rhetorical accident
that the most compelling metaphor in the First Amendment
tradition invokes the marketplace.122 Could it be that Judge
Easterbrook employed categorical reasoning not to weaken the
First Amendment but rather to strengthen it? The most fervent
champion of free speech ever to sit on the Court, Justice Hugo
Black, was also an unrepentant practitioner of categorical reasoning.123 A judge committed to categorical reasoning might, for
example, be unwilling to balance the freedom of speech against
the values of national security,124 fiduciary obligation, 125 or personal reputation.126
Judge Easterbrook's opinion leaves unresolved the question
whether his version of conservatism might yield strong protection
for speech at the center of First Amendment concern. Some of
his rhetoric suggests this possibility- "[t]he First Amendment is
designed to get government out of the business of regulating

121. See, e.g., HAYEK, supra note 73, at 22-53. For a valuable guide to Hayek's thought
see KUKATHAS, supra note 96; see also ALEXANDER H. SHAND, FREE MARKET MORALITY:
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE AUSTRIAN SCHOOL (1990) (arguing that modern economics
is defined not by a conflict between classes, but by a conflict between voluntary selfchosen action and state coercion). Michael Oakeshott identifies conservatism with a respect
for diversity and adaptability. See OAKESHOTT, On Being Conservative, in RATIONALISM IN
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS, supra note 73, at 168, 186-89.
122. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
123. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-20 (1971) (Black,
J., concurring); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1966); Konigsberg v. State Bar,
366 U.S. 36, 60-80 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109,
140-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
124. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579-81 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting)
(stating that the benefits of unfettered political speech are worth the risk to the safety
of the nation).
125. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a former
CIA employee breached his fiduciary duty when, contrary to agreement, he published a
book about his experiences without the agency's prior approval). For Judge Easterbrook's
view of the Snepp decision, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents,
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 309, 339-53.
This article is daunting, for it demonstrates how in Judge Easterbrook's hands the
preference for categorical reasoning can cut against rather than in favor of the protection
of speech that many persons would place at the core of First Amendment concern; in
Snepp, the publication of nonclassified information revealed government ineptitude and
duplicity. The Supreme Court majority in Snepp also employed categorical reasoning to
uphold the censorship of Snepp's criticism of the CIA. Snepp, 444 U.S. at 507-16.
126. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (holding publisher of matters
of public interest subject to liability for defamation of private individual).
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speech" 127 -but his rhetoric critical of judicial review is more
frequent and more impassioned.128 Conservatives committed to a
relatively narrow conception of the First Amendment will have
to decide whether a narrow-but-strong freedom of speech is
consistent with their skepticism concerning the institution of
judicial review.

C. William Rehnquist
One conservative who cannot be accused of attempting to
strengthen the First Amendment by narrowing it is Chief Justice
William Rehnquist. His opinion in Glen Theatre has precisely the
opposite thrust: by finding topless dancing within the ambit of
First Amendment concern, Rehnquist tried to seize the occasion
to win acceptance for the proposition that the enforcement of
morality is a proper basis for limiting the freedom of speech.129
His effort was only partially successful: only Justices Kennedy
and O'Connor joined the Rehnquist opinion.130 Justices Scalia and
Souter went out of their way to avoid having to endorse Chief
Justice Rehnquist's proposition.1a1
The Chief Justice built his analysis around the four-part test
developed by the Court in O'Brien v. United States:
"[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified [1] if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3]
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest." 1a2

127. Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1130 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456
(1991).
128. In arguing that Indiana's ban on nude dancing should be upheld, Judge Easterbrook
narrowly construed his own speech-protective opinion in American-Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (striking down an Indianapolis ordinance prohibiting
the "graphic sexually explicit subordination of women"), afj'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986); see
also Miller, 904 F.2d at 1131 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Judge Posner believed that
American Booksellers required invalidation of the nude dancing prohibition. Id. at 109293 (Posner, J., concurring).
129. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2460-63.
130. Id. at 2458.
131. Id. at 2463-68 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2468-71 (Souter, J., concurring).
132. Id. at 2461 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (quoting O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 377
(1968)).
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The test is directive in the sense that it enumerates four steps
of analysis, but how protective the test turns out to be in
application depends on what meaning is ascribed to two extremely open-textured criteria. First, what determines whether
a governmental interest invoked to justify the regulation of
speech qualifies as "important or substantial''? Do most interests
routinely served 9y general legislation meet this test or does the
special value of the freedom of speech mean that proposed restrictions must serve interests of unusual significance, say interests that are highly tangible, immediately threatened, and
considered by most persons to be of high priority? Second, what
makes an interest "unrelated to the suppression of free expression"? Does "unrelated" mean simply that one could desire to
promote the interest by legislation while remaining indifferent
to the predictable impact of the legislation on speech activities?
Or does "unrelated" mean something stronger: that any impact
on free expression of legislation promoting the interest is speculative, say, or contingent, or marginal? If the O'Brien test is to
be applied broadly, and that tendency was evident long before
the Court's decision in Glen Theatre, 133 the future of the freedom
of speech will depend to a large extent on how these questions
are answered.
If the "important or substantial governmental interest" requirement of the O'Brien_ test134 means something more than "legitimate," more than the minimum regulatory interest that would
suffice to justify a law that restricted a liberty other than the
freedom of speech, one might suppose that the interest in enforcing morality might have difficulty satisfying the test. Not
only is this interest controversial in both scholarly and popular
debate,135 but also claims of moral harm are exceedingly difficult
to specify, confine, or calibrate. Because the enforcement of
morality is the kind of interest that can be neither tested nor
balanced against competing interests, its invocation is likely to
operate as a trump card in constitutional analysis. These problems
need not force a judge to adopt as a matter of constitutional
interpretation the moral philosophy of Professor Hart in preference to that of Lord Devlin. 136 But in the limited realm of First

133.
(1984).
134.
135.
136.

See, e.g., Los Angeles City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05
O'Brum, 391 U.S. at 376·77.
See 1:W:pra note 45.
See DEVLIN, supra note 41; HART, supra note 42.
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Amendment adjudication, they might lead a judge to conclude
that the otherwise legitimate state interest in enforcing morality
ought not to be considered the kind of "important or substantial"137
governmental interest that can justify the regulation of speech
that falls within the ambit of First Amendment concern.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was not persuaded by this line of
argument. He recounted the venerable statutory history of morals
regulation, in Indiana and elsewhere, and noted also the common
law roots of the public indecency concept.138 Reciting the familiar
trilogy of legitimate governmental interests, he refused to relegate morals enforcement to any kind of inferior status as a
justification for limiting personal liberty: "[t]he traditional police
power of the States is defined as the authority to provide for
the public health, safety, and morals."139 He observed also that
the Supreme Court had recognized the legitimacy of moral interests when it upheld state prohibitions on private, consensual
homosexuality and obscenity.140 Pointedly, Rehnquist disclaimed
any effort to bolster the interest in morals enforcement with an
appeal to instrumental concerns, observing that "the governmental interest _served by the text of the prohibition is societal
disapproval of nudity in public places and among strangers. The
statutory prohibition is not a means to some greater end, but an
end in itself."141
The approval of the enforcement of morality as a justification
for regulating speech-even an approval so emphatic and enthusiastic as that expressed by the Chief Justice-need not inexorably have sweeping implications. First, the morality justification
could be confined to regulations of speech that are "unrelated to
the suppression of free expression."142 That concept, one of the
four elements of the O'Brien test,143 could be interpreted to
include only regulatory efforts to control harms that derive not
from the communicative impact of an activity but rather from
its ancillary physical consequences. If, for example, due to the
physical concentration of a receptive clientele, prostitution were
shown to flourish in areas in which adult entertainment establishments are located, the interest in enforcing morality might

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461-62 (1991).
Id. at 2462.
Id.
Id. at 2463.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
See supra text accompanying note 132.
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justify some sort of a dispersal requirement. Second, the morality
justification could be confined to regulations of "low value" speech,
instances of communication that are neither outside the ambit of
First Amendment concern nor at the "core." In Glen Theatre,
Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed the first suggested limitation
explicitly and used ambiguous qualifying language that might be
read to lend support to the second.144
The Chief Justice declined to interpret the "unrelated to the
suppression of free expression" element of the O'Brien test to
mean that the harm that justifies the regulation must not be a
product of the communicative impact of the activity the state
wishes to regulate.145 Instead, he considered the appropriate
inquiry to be whether by regulating the activity the state seeks
to prevent a message from reaching an audience. 146 It would be
difficult to maintain that the moral objection to nude dancing is
not a consequence of the communicative impact of the activity,
and Rehnquist did not so maintain. Whether the moral objection
relates to a "message" is more open to dispute. Rehnquist found
the state's concern broader than that, and hence in his view
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression":
[W]e do not think that when Indiana applies its statute to the
nude dancing in these nightclubs it is proscribing nudity because of the erotic message conveyed by the dancers. Presumably numerous other erotic performances are presented at
these establishments and similar clubs without any interference
from the state, so long as the performers wear a scant amount
of clothing. Likewise, the requirement that the dancers don
pasties and a G-string does not deprive the dance of whatever
erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly
less graphic. The perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address
is not erotic dancing, but public nudity. 147

Rehnquist did not indicate whether he thought a clothing requirement could ever amount to an effort to suppress a message. If,
for example, dancers were required to wear tutus or leotards, or
if museums were forced to add figleaves to depictions of nudes,
would the state's moral interest be "unrelated to the suppression
of free expression"?

144.
145.
146.
147.

Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2462-63.

Id. at 2462.
Id. at 2463.
Id.
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The Chief Justice refused to regard striptease dancing as
outside the ambit of First Amendment concern, but he qualified
his conclusion in a way that might suggest a limitation on the
potential sweep of the morality justification. He stated: "nude
dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive
conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment,
though we view it as only marginally so." 148 Perhaps the enforcement of morality is a permissible justification in the realm of the
First Amendment only when the activity regulated is "expressive
conduct" rather than verbal speech. Or perhaps expressive conduct, nonverbal as well as verbal, is not subject to moral prohibition when the activity is more political, or in some other sense
less peripheral, than is nude dancing. That notion might serve
to distinguish the flagburning decisions. 149 Perhaps by his comment about marginality, the Chief Justice meant to invoke a
distinction between high culture and low culture such that impresarios and museum directors have nothing to fear from the
decision in Glen Theatre. The logic of the Rehnquist opinion could
accommodate some or all of these limitations on the power to
enforce morality, but the opinion itself leaves these possibilities
of containment unexplored.
In the last analysis, what is most notable about Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion in the case is how little the issue of morals
enforcement engaged his intellect. In contrast to all the other
conservative judges who wrote opinions, Rehnquist seemed untroubled by the expansive potential of the morality justification
as applied to speech. Given the high quality and spirited clash
of the opinions in the Court of Appeals, this reaction seems
surprising. Moreover, in light of the lengthy, informed discussions
by Judges Posner and Easterbrook regarding the government's
authority to enforce morality in the fine arts, not to mention the
recent public turmoil over this question, 150 it is troubling (and
perhaps revealing) that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not explain
how, under his interpretation of the First Amendment, Indiana
would not have the power to prohibit nudity in museum paintings
or ballet performances, examples that were raised repeatedly
during the litigation.151
148. Id. at 2460.
149. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (striking down a statute that
criminalized flagburning); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (same).
150. See Rohde, supra note 40, at 358-73, 393-94.
151. See, e.g., Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
bane), rrw'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); id. at 1093,
1096, 1102, 1104 (Posner, J., concurring); Gl,en, Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2473 (White, J.,
dissenting).

644

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 33:611

One has to believe that if the Chief Justice had in mind a
distinction that would exempt the fine arts from morals enforcement he would have disclosed it. His silence on the point suggests
that he is indeed prepared to countenance a return to figleaves.
A judge could reach that position by embracing what might be
termed, ironically, the populist version of legal conservatism.
The central tenet of populist conservatism is a faith in the
wisdom and responsibility of legislative majorities and electorally
accountable executive officials. In this view, the overriding value
of constitutional democracy is majority rule. When in the course
of legal argument a party challenges a claim of state authority
by pointing to its potentially far reaching consequences, the
conservative populist response is "trust the people." Majoritarian
moralists will not try to censor ballet performances. They will
tolerate nudity in museums. And if the censorial impulse does
reach into those precincts, artists and their patrons are not
lacking in political clout. Judge Bork put the point well: "Freedom
of non-political speech rests, as does freedom for other valuable
forms of behavior, upon the enlightenment of society and its
elected representatives. That is hardly a terrible fate. At least
a society like ours ought not to think it so."152
Chief Justice Rehnquist's ambiguous, unelaborated opinion in
Glen Theatre does not provide enough direction to mark him as
a conservative populist on the question of morals enforcement
over the arts. One of the curious developments of modern political
argument in the United States, however, is the extent to which
self-described conservatives have come to be skeptical about
rights and trusting of majorities. In other areas of constitutional
dispute, the Chief Justice has been in the forefront of this
development. 153 A major question facing legal conservatives now
that they dominate the federal judiciary is whether this improbable populism was largely a reactive posture, a way to attack
liberal judicial decisions, or whether it reflects a deeper current
in the conservative philosophy, one that will survive the pressures and responsibilities that accompany the acquisition of power.

D. Antonin Scalia
Justice Antonin Scalia also rejected the contention that topless
dancing enjoys constitutional protection, but he devoted a good
152. Bork, supra note 55, at 28.
153. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J.); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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part of his opm1on in Gum Theatre to an effort to contain the
doctrinal implications of that judgment. Like both Chief Justice
Rehnquist 154 and Judge Easterbrook,155 Scalia attributed much
significance to the generality of Indiana's prohibition on public
nudity. 156 He noted that "Indiana officials have brought many
public indecency prosecutions for activities having no communicative element." 157 This generality principle has appealed to Justice
Scalia for some time,158 and recently has been invoked by other
conservative judges in a variety of contex~s.159 If applied indiscriminately, the principle could be used to rewrite a great deal
of First Amendment doctrine protective of speakers. It is important, therefore, that Justice Scalia, the judge who has given the
principle its fullest articulation and defense, viewed the generality principle as applicable to only one subset of free speech
disputes, cases involving the regulation of expressive conduct.
Many laws used to punish unpopular speakers are not specifically targeted against, or restricted in application to, activities
that enjoy First Amendment protection. The most ignominious
instances of political repression in this century involved the
application of a federal law making it a crime to "obstruct the
recruiting service."160 That law prohibited obstruction of the draft
by any means, not just by persuasion. The government claimed
authority to enjoin publication of the Pentagon Papers under a
law directed against espionage.161 Probably the most common

154. See Gum Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2460 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
155. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1120.
156. See Gum Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2464 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Id.
158. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Community for Creative NonViolence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622-23 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Scalia, J., dissenting), rev'd sub
?Wm. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); see also Antonin
Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (defending the
generality principle).
159. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991) (holding that a state's
extension of its generally applicable sales tax to cable television services alone, while
exempting print media, does not violate First Amendment); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,
111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) (deciding that generally applicable laws do not offend the
First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental
effects on its ability to gather and report the news).
160. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 49 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 205 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); see also Goldman
v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918) (upholding conviction of conspiracy for attempting
to persuade individuals to refuse to register under the Selective Draft Law).
161. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The government
unsuccessfully invoked 18 U.S.C. § 793(e) (1970) as well as the inherent power of the
President. Id. at 718.
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basis for prosecuting civil rights protesters during the 1960's
was for "breach of the peace" or "disorderly conduct," 162 crimes
that cover a broad spectrum of antisocial activities, most of them
nonverbal and outside the ambit of First Amendment concern.
Were the Supreme Court to apply only deferential constitutional
review whenever speech is regulated under laws not targeted
specifically against expression, the First Amendment would be
as easy to circumvent as the constitutional prohibition against
laws impairing the obligation of contracts has come to be. 163
In Glen Theatre, Justice Scalia evinced no desire to employ the
generality principle to rewrite First Amendment doctrine on a
grand scale. So long as "oral and written speech" is involved, he
expressed a willingness to subject state regulation to the traditionally demanding standard of scrutiny without regard to the
generality of the prohibition: "When any law restricts speech,
even for a purpose that has nothing to do with the suppression
of communication (for instance to reduce noise, to regulate election campaigns, or to prevent littering), we insist that it meet
the high, First-Amendment standard of justification." 164 Moreover, for nonverbal forms of communication he would apply a
comparably stringent level of judicial review "where the government prohibits conduct precisely because of its communicative
attributes." 165 Interestingly, in the flag burning cases Justice
Scalia joined the majority opinions upholding the First Amend162. See, e.g., Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 559 (1965); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
163. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502-06 (1987)
(holding that the Contracts Clause should not be read literally to disallow reasonable
exercises of the States' police power to protect the public health and welfare); Energy
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 (1983) (holding that
prohibition against states impairing contract obligations must be accommodated to inherent police power of state to "safeguard the vital interests of its people"); El Paso v.
Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 508 (1965) (holding that the Contracts Clause prohibition "is not
an absolute one and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathematical formula");
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (stating that Contracts
Clause is "general" and thus requires construction to "fill in the details"). The Contracts
Clause is not a dead letter, see Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
242-44 (1978) (stating that Contracts Clause does impose some limits on power of a state
to abridge existing contractual relationships); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,
431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) (stating that Contract Clause is not "without meaning" or "illusory"
in its limitation of state power); but neither is it a significant check on the regulatory
power of government.
164. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2465-66 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
165. Id. at 2466.
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ment claims of the protesters.166 Scalia discerned an appropriate
way to confine his generality principle by utilizing the familiar
distinction between speech and conduct: Laws that restrict
"speech" are not saved by the fact that by design and definition
they also restrict nonspeech activities; 167 but laws that restrict
nonverbal communicative conduct that falls within the ambit of
First Amendment concern can be saved by their generality unless
"suppressing communication was the object of the regulation of
conduct." 168
Thus, Justice Scalia employed the speech-conduct distinction
for a narrower purpose than did Judge Easterbrook in the court
below, who viewed the distinction as the basis for a comprehensive categorical interpretation of the First Amendment. 169 Scalia
also declined to follow Judge Easterbrook's lead in developing
definitions of "speech" and "conduct" that would place ballet on
the "speech" side of the line. Although his opinion is not as
explicit on this important point as one would like, Justice Scalia
presumably would consider photography, film, painting, and sculpture to be "speech" even when words are not employed, but
dance and mime "conduct" even when the gestures are stylized,
choreographed, and unmistakably of narrative import. Apparently, the physical immediacy of live, human movement is the
essential phenomenon that delimits the boundary of First Amendment concern except when such conduct is prohibited precisely
because of the message it conveys.170 The implication of this
analysis is that Justice Scalia would find no First Amendment
violation in a state's application of its general public indecency
statute against nude ballet (opera is more difficult because a diva
might be singing or declaiming while disrobing), but would strike
down the enforcement of such a statute against nonobscene
depictions of nudes in painting, sculpture, or photography.
Strauss's Salome is at risk, but Titian's Venus is safe.
As these examples illustrate, almost any effort to limit the
scope of First Amendment concern is bound to generate perplex-

166. See United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989).
167. See Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2466.
168. Id.
169. See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1123-30 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane),
rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991); supra notes 108-19.
170. See Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2465-66.
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ing, even embarrassing, problems of definition and application.
Justice Scalia is a bold thinker but not a foolish one.171 Why
would he embrace a distinction so vulnerable as that between
"speech" and "conduct"? The answer, it seems, can be found in
his concern about the limitless character of the morality justification.
Like Judge Posner before him, Justice Scalia rejected the
contention that state authority to restrict liberty must be premised on some finding of harm, if only offense to inadvertent
viewers: "[T]here is no basis for thinking that our society has
ever shared that Thoreauvian 'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-longas-it-does-not-injure-someone-else' beau ideal-much less for
thinking that it was written into the Constitution." 172 Citing
examples ranging from cockfighting to suicide, he noted that
"society prohibits, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but because they
are considered, in the traditional phrase, 'contra bonos mores,'
i.e. immoral." 173 Given the prevalence and general acceptance of
the regulation of harmless wrongdoing, Justice Scalia found no
basis for a comprehensive constitutional limitation on the enforcement of morality:
While there may be great diversity of view on whether various
of these prohibitions should exist (though I have found few
ready to abandon, in principle, all of them) there is no doubt
that, absent specific constitutional protection for the conduct
involved, the Constitution does not prohibit them simply because they regulate "morality." 174

Scalia stated his defense of the constitutional legitimacy of
morals enforcement in the strongest terms, but he also offered
a qualification that explains why he felt a great need to confine
the scope of application of First Amendment principles. He said
the enforcement of morality is not problematic "absent specific
constitutional protection for the conduct involved." 175 By clear
implication, Justice Scalia was reluctant to permit morality to
serve as a constitutionally sufficient basis for the regulation of
171. For sophisticated analyses of Justice Scalia's judicial philosophy, see Richard A.
Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism of Antonin Scalia, 105 POL. Ser. Q. 1 (1990); George Kannar,
The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297 (1990).
172. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2465.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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activities that qualify as "speech" in the First Amendment sense.
He criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion for finding the dancing at issue to be subject to First Amendment
principles but then upholding Indiana's law on the ground that
it served an important governmental interest. "[W]e should avoid
wherever possible," Justice Scalia said, "a method of analysis
that requires judicial assessment of the 'importance' of government interests-and especially of government interests in various
aspects of morality."11s
·
Scalia took the Chief Justice to task for relying in his opinion
on the Court's acceptance in earlier cases of moral justifications
for the regulation of homosexuality and obscenity.177 Those cases,
Scalia observed, did not involve activities within the ambit of
First Amendment concern, and thus do not support the conclusion
that the enforcement of morality can justify restrictions on the
freedom of speech. 178 All that was required to uphold laws prohibiting homosexuality and obscenity was the permissive due
process standard of "rational basis," and that is the only standard
the enforcement of morality has been found to satisfy. 179 Because
in his view dancing is conduct, not speech, Scalia felt that he
could invoke the state's interest in morals enforcement and the
authority of the cases on homosexuality and obscenity in a way
that Chief Justice Rehnquist, with his broader view of the scope
of the First Amendment, could not: "I would uphold the Indiana
statute on precisely the same ground: moral opposition to nudity
supplies a rational basis for its prohibition, and since the First
Amendment has no application to this case no more than that is
needed."180
Justice Scalia's First Amendment may be narrow in scope, but
within its ambit it may be a genuine and powerful constraint on
majority rule. In this regard, Justice Scalia's brand of judicial
conservatism has more in common with that of Judge Posner,
and possibly Judge Easterbrook, than with the rather different
conservatism of Chief Justice Rehnquist.

E. David Souter
Probably the most universally respected Justice to sit on the
Court during the last fifty years was the conservative John
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2466.
Id. at 2467-68.
Id. at 2468.
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Marshall Harlan. What made Justice Harlan an impressive judge,
even in the eyes of those who disagreed with his conclusions on
issues large and small, was his unfailing intellectual integrity.181
He did not try to push propositions further than they would go,
and, even more remarkably, he seemed really to want to understand and deal fairly with opposing arguments. Justice Harlan's
opinions typically illuminate even when they do not persuade,
and this even though the Justice possessed neither unusual
eloquence nor extraordinary analytic power. He possessed something more important for a judge: an open mind. Many people,
some of them judges, are openminded out of apathy, laziness,
ignorance, or a desire to please. Justice Harlan was openminded,
I believe, for different reasons. He knew too much and cared too
much about the American constitutional tradition to stop thinking
inquisitively about it once he had identified his own major premises of constitutional analys~s.
It is unfair to ask a judge to be "the next Harlan." (So many
young golfers over the years have been touted as "the next
Nicklaus" that wags now ask who is "the next next Nicklaus.")
With that disclaimer, it is nonetheless worth noting that of the
six opinions by conservative judges under discussion, the one
that most resembles the work of Justice Harlan is that by Justice
David Souter. Justice Souter voted to uphold the application of
Indiana's law to prohibit nude dancing; Justice Harlan might
have reached the opposite conclusion. But the Souter opinion
displays those qualities of attention to the complexity of a dispute
and care about the reach of a proposition that so marked the
opinions of Justice Harlan.
Justice Souter agreed with Judge Posner and Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and disagreed with Judge Easterbrook and Justice
181. For admiring portraits of Justice Harlan, see the articles in the issue of the
Harvard Law Review dedicated to the Justice: Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Harlan,
As Seen by a Friend and Judge of an Inferior Court, 85 HARV. L. REV 382 (1971); J.
Edward Lumbard, John Harlan: In Public Service 1925-1971, 85 HARV. L. REV. 372 (1971);
Charles Nesson, Mr. Justice Harlan, 85 HARV. L. REV. 390 (1971); Earl Warren, Mr.
Justice Harlan, As Seen by a Colleague, 85 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1971); John E.F. Wood,
John M. Harlan, As Seen by a Colleague in the Practice of Law, 85 HARV. L. REV. 377
(1971); see also Daniel A. Farber, Civilizing Public Discourse: An Essay on Professor Bickel,
Justice Harlan, and the Enduring Significance of Cohen v. California, 1980 DUKE L.J. 283
(examining Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen in a favorable way); Gerald Gunther, In
Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.
REV. 1001, 1002-14 (1972) (comparing Justice Powell with the "master craftsman," Justice
Harlan, and analyzing the Harlan judicial model); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Justice John
M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REv.1185 (1971) (examining the effect
of Justice Harlan's analytic and objective jurisprudence on the evolution of the Court).
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Scalia, that striptease dancing enjoys "a degree of First Amendment protection."182 Not all nude display is expression in the
First Amendment sense nor is all dancing, ballroom and aerobic
dancing for example. But "dancing as a performance directed to
an actual or hypothetical audience gives expression at least to
generalized emotion or feeling, and where the dancer is nude or
nearly so the feeling expressed, in the absence of some contrary
clue, is eroticism, carrying an endorsement of erotic experience."183 Souter conceded that nudity by itself can be expressive.
He thought, however, that the First Amendment requires more:
[T]he voluntary assumption of that condition, without more,
apparently expresses nothing beyond the view that the condition is somehow appropriate to the circumstances. But every
voluntary act implies some such idea, and the implication is
thus so common and minimal that calling all voluntary activity
expressive would reduce the concept of expression to the point
of the meaningless. 184

He found the extra dimensions of expression provided by the
integration of music, dance, and disrobing sufficient to differentiate stripte~se from common forms of indecent public exposure.185
Souter also agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that the fourpart O'Brien test186 applied. Justice Souter. reached that judgment, however, only because the case involved "the limits of
appropriate state action burdening expressive acts as distinct
from pure speech or representation."187 In contrast, the Chief
Justice cited cases involving films and music in asserting the
applicability of O'Brien, 188 thus indicating that he was prepared
to apply that not-so-protective standard beyond its original domain of disputes over symbolic physical conduct.189

182. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2468.
188. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 867 (1968); see discussion supra notes 132-33
and accompanying text.
187. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2468.
188. Id. at 2460 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding
municipal noise regulations affecting music performances did not violate the free speech
rights of performers); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that
a zoning ordinance setting limitations on the location of adult motion picture theaters
was a valid governmental response and satisfied the dictates of the First Amendment)).
189. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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Both in his effort to delineate the scope of the First Amendment's concern with expressive conduct and in his effort to
confine the domain of the O'Brien test, Justice Souter displayed
a willingness to search for limiting principles. That aspect of his
temperament may also explain why he could not accept Chief
Justice Rehnquist's proposition that the state's interest in the
enforcement of morality can serve as a justification for restricting
activities that enjoy First Amendment protection. After noting
his areas of agreement with the Chief Justice's view of the case,
Souter said: "I nonetheless write separately to rest my concurrence in the judgment, not on the possible sufficiency of society's
moral views to justify the limitations at issue, but on the State's
substantial interest in combating the secondary effects of adult
entertainment establishments of the sort typified by respondents'
establishments."190
Justice Souter plainly considers material harms to be the
preferable, and possibly the exclusive, basis for restricting First
Amendment rights of expression. In the case of striptease dancing, he found those material harms in the possible link between
such dancing in certain settings and "prostitution, sexual assault,
and associated crimes." 191 Of course, such a causal link is disputable, and certainly was not proven in the record to have existed
regarding the particular dances at issue. Moreover, even if prostitutes were shown to have solicited outside the Kitty Kat Lounge
or if rapes had been committed by patrons of the Glen Theatre,
the standard of causation the Court applies to speech at the
center of First Amendment concern would not have been satisfied. Presumably no one would claim that the dances of Ms.
Miller and Ms. Sutro were "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and likely to incite or produce such
action." 192 One reason those who would regulate expression seek
the authority to invoke moral justifications is that justifications
grounded in claims of material harm are more susceptible to
demands for evidence and requirements of temporal proximity.
Justice Souter acknowledged this difficulty with his analysis
but proposed a way to avoid the demanding standard of causation
that has been a central feature of First Amendment doctrine
since the opinions of Holmes and Brandeis. 193 Souter reasoned
that although sexually explicit expressive conduct enjoys "a degree of First Amendment protection," 194 it does not warrant the
190.
191.
192.
193.

Gl,en Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2468-69.
Id. at 2470.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
Justice Holmes introduced the clear-and-present-danger test in Schenck v. United
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level of protection accorded the most highly valued forms of
expression.195 Twice in his opinion he made this point, each time
citing the cases in which the Supreme Court had upheld zoning
restrictions on theaters showing sexually explicit but nonobscene
films on the basis of a presumed, generalized causal connection
between the presence of such theaters and neighborhood deterioration.196 In one of those cases Justice Stevens, writing for a
plurality, sa.id: "[S]ociety's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than
the interest in untrammeled political debate."197 Justice Souter
quoted this statement with approval. 198
Justice Souter's willingness to apply special, less protective
First Amendment standards to striptease dancing on the ground
"that the protection of sexually explicit expression may be of
lesser societal importance than the protection of other forms of
expression"199 raises a number of questions. First, if we are to
have such a multitiered First Amendment, perhaps the ,enforcement of morality ought to be considered a cognizable regulatory
interest on the lower tiers. Souter seems to have rejected this
course in Glen Theatre. He strained to find a sufficient causal
connection to material harm in order to avoid having to rely on
the morality justification, even when the speech at issue ranks
low on his scale of First Amendment value.
Second, if generalized, undocumented claims of causal connection to material harm can justify the regulation of sexually
explicit expression, what constitutional principle protects nude
ballet: painting, sculpture, and "serious" film? Souter suggested
that the likelihood of material secondary effects varies depending
on the setting in which the sexually explicit expression is viewed.200
That variation supplies the elusive principled basis for distinguishing high-culture nudity from its low-life counterpart:

States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 627-29 (1919), and Justice Brandeis in his concurring opinion in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357, 376-78 (1927), construed the test to require specific, imminent,
material harm. The modern formulation of the test emphasizes the requirement of
temporal proximity. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
194. GT.en Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2468; see supra text accompanying note 183.
195. GT.en Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2470.
196. Id. (citing Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976)); id. at 2471
n.3 (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
197. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 70.
198. GT.en Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2470 (quoting id.).
199. Id. at 2471 n.3.
200. Id. at 2470 n.2.
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It is difficult to see, for example, how the enforcement of
Indiana's statute against nudity in a production of "Hair" or
"Equus" somewhere other than an "adult" theater would further the State's interest in avoiding harmful secondary effects,
in the absence of evidence that expressive nudity outside the
context of Renton-type adult entertainment was correlated with
such secondary effects.201
Third, if speculative, delayed effects can sometimes justify the
regulation of First Amendment expression "of lesser societal
importance,"202 can sexist, racist, and other varieties of stereotyping employed in nonpolitical speech be regulated on account
of the long-term harm such speech causes members of the groups
so stereotyped? Justice Souter did not address this question, but
he defined "secondary effects" in such a way that the diffuse,
delayed, but nonetheless potentially substantial consequences of
stereotyping would not qualify. If the material harms could result
only from "the persuasive effect" of speech, he said, they cannot
serve as a justification for regulation under the secondary effects
rationale.203 Only harms that are caused in some other way count
as "secondary effects." With regard to nude dancing:
It is possible, for example, that the higher incidence of prostitution and sexual assault in the vicinity of adult entertainment locations results from the concentration of crowds of men
predisposed to such activities, or from the simple viewing of
nude bodies regardless of whether those nude bodies are engaged in expression or not. In neither case would the chain of
causation run through the persuasive effect of the expressive
component of nude dancing. 204
Souter did not explain how Indiana's requirement that go-go
dancers wear pasties and a G-string could be thought, even
speculatively, to have any incremental impact on the secondary
effects he had posited.
On the evidence of his opinion in Glen Theatre, Justice Souter's
brand of judicial conservatism builds on the virtues of careful
attention to nuance and context and the disinclination to employ
sweeping propositions. That type of conservatism can produce

201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 2471 n.3; see s'U'pra note 195 and accompanying text.
Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2470.
Id. at 2470-71.
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doctrines that are overly complex and judgments that lack courage. On the other hand, humility and patience are conservative
virtues of the first order that often correlate with the willingness
to notice distinctions and the desire to identify limiting principles.
For those who believe that the concept of conservatism speaks
to temperament more than to first principles, Justice Souter may
better deserve the label than any of his brethren.
Justice Souter may be a true conservative in the sense just
described, but his opinion does not leave one convinced that he
is a judge worthy of being compared with Justice Harlan in the
matter of intellectual self-discipline. Why was Justice Souter so
quick to credit without any evidence the claim that nonobscene
nude dancing bears a significant causal connection to rape or
sexual assault? Why did he not address the troubling point for
his rationale that if nonobscene nude dancing might indirectly
lead to a higher incidence of sexual assault, so too might live
erotic dancing by partially clothed women as well as sexually
suggestive depictions and plots in nonobscene films? A judge can
be perceptive, rhetorically restrained, and sensitive to nuance
and still be rather result oriented. The Souter opinion in Glen
Theatre is a good deal more illuminating than the opinions of
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, but one still is not
left with the impression that Justice Souter approached the case
with a willingness to follow his analysis wherever it might lead.
Of course, few judges possess that kind of temperament. Justice
Harlan did, and that is largely why his performance as a judicial
conservative is the demanding standard by which current Justices
tend to be measured.

F. Byron White
Some might question whether Justice Byron White, the lone
member of the Supreme Court appointed by a Democratic president (Kennedy), should be considered a conservative. In his early
years as a Justice, White took a broad view of the Equal Protection Clause in cases involving alleged discrimination on the
basis of race or poverty.205 In recent years he frequently has
found himself agreeing with conservative Justices, but typically
has not indulged in the rhetoric or displayed the zeal that
characterizes the modern conservative challenge to the Warren
Court legacy. As the pendulum has swung ever farther to the
205. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. l, 67-68 (1973)
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right, Justice White lately has b~gun to dissent from conservative
rulings, even in the area of criminal procedure in which his
general tendency ever since he joined the Court has been to
interpret the rights of the accused narrowly.206
With regard to the First Amendment, however, Justice White's
credentials as a conservative are impeccable. He has written
many of the Court's opinions rejecting the First Amendment
claims of journalists.207 He dissented from the Court's decisions
holding flagburning to be constitutionally protected. 208 He even
wrote an opinion questioning the continuing soundness of New
(White, J., dissenting) (finding that great disparity in property values between rich and
poor school districts made the Texas system of public school financing violative of the
Equal Protection Clause); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1967) (upholding a
California Supreme Court decision that the Equal Protection Clause prevents a state
from supporting racial discrimination in private housing matters).
206. His early dissents from liberal decisions of the Warren Court in the area of
criminal procedure include United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 250-59 (1967) (White, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to a constitutional requirement that counsel be present at any
identification of the accused by a witness because the rule was too broad, without a
factual basis, and interfered with the state's interests); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
526-45 (1966) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the new constitutional requirement that
warnings be given to a person in custody prior to questioning because the opinion lacked
factual and textual bases, and lacked a thorough analysis of the interest in law enforcement); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 617-23 (1965) (White, J., joining in dissenting
opinion of Stewart, J.) (criticizing the holding that a state prosecutor's comments and
jury instructions that commented on an accused's failure to testify violated the SelfIncrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the compulsion involved was not
the serious type contemplated by the Amendment, and was merely a state's policy choice
to bring into the light of rational discussion a fact already clearly known to the jury).
Recent instances in which Justice White dissented from decisions denying the constitutional claims of criminal defendants include California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982, 1994
(1991) (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the holding that a warrant is not required
to search a particular container within a automobile when police have probable cause to
believe the container holds contraband or evidence); Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct.
1246, 1253-57 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (holding a defendant's confession was coerced
and was not harmless, but dissenting from the holding that the harmless error rule
applied to admission of involuntary confessions); Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 250713 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the holding that a conviction under a
state jury instruction that did not distinguish between premeditated murder and felony
murder did not deny due process, and also dissenting from the holding that the failure
to instruct regarding a lesser included offense of robbery did not render the first degree
murder verdict the result of an impermissible choice when the jury was given the option
of convicting for the lesser included offense of second degree murder); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2709-19 (1991) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the holding
that the imposition of a mandatory term of life in prison without possibility of parole
and without consideration of mitigating factors did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment; and asserting that the Eighth Amendment imposes a general proportionality
requirement, even in noncapital cases, and as such was violated in this case).
207. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991); Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
208. United States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 2410 (1990) (White, J., joining in
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York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 209 the Court's landmark decision
granting extraordinary First Amendment protection to defamatory criticism of government officials.210 His vote to prevent the
government from suppressing the Pentagon Papers was based
not on a grand reading of the First Amendment but rather on a
rejection of the expansive claims of presidential power to impose
a prior restraint, unsupported by congressional authorization,
that were presented in the case;211 White all but invited the
government to proceed against the publishers of the Papers by
means of criminal prosecution under the Espionage Act.212 Just
as today he shuns conservative rhetoric regarding the intentions
of the framers or the perils of judicial activism, Justice White
has always declined to wax eloquent about the nobility of the
inquiring mind or the watchdog function of an independent press.
Justice White appears to view the freedom of speech much
like he views all claims of individual liberty: with a tough-minded
skepticism, particularly toward arguments grounded in claims of
human dignity. One gets the impression that Justice White is
disdainful of the elaborate, partly symbolic exaltation of "the
individual'' that characterizes so much of our constitutional tradition. Harry Kalve.n once described the First Amendment as
"gallant, almost quixotic." 213 Byron White is probably the least
quixotic Justice of the modern era. He is the quintessential Legal
Realist, interested in material consequences not symbols or fancies of the mind.
In Glen Theatre, Justice White wrote a dissenting opinion that
Justices Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens joined. 214 It is noteworthy that a Justice with such a conservative history regarding
interpretation of the First Amendment should have concluded
that nude dancing enjoys constitutional protection. That Justice
White wrote the Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick, 215 upholding a state's enforcement of morality against consensual
homosexual relations, adds further interest to his dissent in Glen
Theatre.
dissenting opinion of Stevens, J.); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 421 (1989) (White, J.,
joining in dissenting opinion of Rehnquist, C.J.).
209. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
210. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 765-67 (1985)
(White, J., concurring).
211. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 732 (1971) (White, J.,
concurring).
212. See id. at 733-37.
213. Harry Kalven was my teacher at the University of Chicago Law School. I recall
him saying this in class.
214. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2471-76 (1991).
215. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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It seems that with regard to the effort to criminalize nude
dancing, Justice White's longstanding hostility to legal claims of
a symbolic, unspecific character worked to the detriment of the
state's assertion of regulatory authority. He plainly was skeptical
regarding what Indiana hoped to achieve by this law. He noted
that "it is impossible to discern the exact state interests which
the Indiana legislature had in mind when it enacted the Indiana
statute." 216 He criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
accepting "societal order and morality" as a sufficiently specific
and informative description of the state's regulatory interest.217
White then tried to supply the missing specification on ·his own.
The state could not be concerned with protecting unwilling or
inadvertent viewers from offense because the dances at issue
were performed indoors before willing, fully forewarned audiences. Nor could the state be enforcing a judgment that nudity
in the presence of other persons is always indecent or degrading
because Indiana asserted no authority or desire to start prosecuting the full range of nude encounters, for example among
friends and relatives in homes or among strangers in locker
rooms. On this point, Justice White distinguished the Court's
prior decisions upholding comprehensive prohibitions, applicable
without regard to setting or context, on the destruction of draft
cards, the practice of homosexuality, and the smoking of peyote.218
Because nudity per se is not the evil to be addressed, Justice
White concluded that the rationale for the law must have something to do with the state's desire to protect willing viewers
from the impact of the experience of viewing nude figures in
certain settings, as contrasted with other settings in which the
impact would be different. But what is special, in terms of the
impact on viewers, about the setting of a bar or a theater in
which nude women perform dances to music? What is special,
Justice White concluded, is the erotic message that is conveyed
by that variety of nudity:
Legislators do not just randomly select certain conduct for
proscription; they have reasons for doing so and those reasons
illuminate the purpose of the law that is passed . . . . The
purpose of the proscription in these contexts is to protect the

216. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2472.
217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
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viewers from what the State believes is the harmful message
that nude dancing communicates.219

The state denied that it sought to prevent the communication
of an erotic message by noting that all sorts of erotic dances,
including those employing the barest minimum of clothing (pasties
and a G-string), remained outside the reach of the law.220 Nudity,
not an erotic message, was the trigger of illegality. Justice White
was not convinced: "The sight of a fully clothed~ or even a
partially clothed, dancer generally will have a far different impact
on a spectator than that of a nude dancer, even if the same dance
is performed. The nudity is itself an expressive component of
the dance, not merely incidental 'conduct.' "221
To conclude that when unpacked analytically the State's interest in "order and morality" reduces to an interest in protecting
audiences from certain erotic messages still does not prove that
the state interest is constitutionally insufficient. Many conservatives would not deny that the harm in nude dancing is indeed
in the message it communicates, and would claim that a proper
function of government is to prevent the degradation of the
society, including the degradation that is caused by certain messages.222
This type of argument might appeal to many conservatives,
but not to a tough-minded, skeptical conservative like Justice
White, who values both analytical precision and proof of harm.
He is not impressed by quixotic gestures in defense of morality
or speculative judgments regarding the long-term cultural consequences of certain messages. He concluded that both legislatures and judges must have more solid grounding before overriding
the First Amendment principle against content regulation:
That the performances in the Kitty Kat Lounge may not be
high art, to say the least, and may not appeal to the Court, is
hardly an excuse for distorting and ignoring settled doctrine.
The Court's assessment of the artistic merits of nude dancing
performances should not be the determining factor in deciding

219. Id. at 2473.
220. Id.; see also id. at 2464 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that the state's argument
was that the statute was neutral and not directed at expression); id. at 2463 (presuming
the state does not interfere with other erotic performances if a scant amount of clothing
is worn).
221. Id. at 2474.
222. See, e.g., BERNS, supra note 45, at 212-28.
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this case. In the words of Justice Harlan, "it is largely because
governmental officials cannot make principled decisions in this
area that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style so
largely to the individual."223

Justice White applied his demand for analytical precision also
to the "secondary effects" rationale articulated by Justice Souter.
Again, he found that the regulatory justification failed to survive
critical scrutiny:
If Justice SOUTER is correct that there is no causal connection between the message conveyed by the nude dancing
at issue here and the negative secondary effects that the State
desires to regulate, the State does not have even a rational
basis for its absolute prohibition on nude dancing that is
admittedly expressive. Furthermore, if the real problem is the
"concentration of crowds of men predisposed to the" designated
evils, then the First Amendment requires that the State address that problem in a fashion that does not include banning
an entire category of expressive activity.224

From Edmund Burke to Michael Oakeshott, leading conservative thinkers traditionally have been skeptical of ideology, partly
because a devotion to ideology can lead one to a ·single-minded
pursuit of objectives and a failure to appreciate the complexity
of life, the relevance of history, and the efficacy of arrangements
that have survived the evolutionary process. 225 Justice White
appears to share those sentiments. Not all conservatives would
consider the moral objection to public nudity to be an ideology,
nor the common practice of nude go-go dancing to be a social
institution worthy of respect by virtue of the fact that it has
evolved and commands a market. But regulation in the name of

223. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2474-75 (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25
(1971)).
224. Id. at 2474 n.2 (citation omitted) (quoting Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. at 2471 (Souter,
J., concurring)) (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986)).
225. Russell Kirk's anthology, The Portabw Conservative Reader, contains many statements in this vein. See JOHN ADAMS, DISCOURSES ON DAVILA, in RUSSELL KIRK, THE
PORTABLE CONSERVATIVE READER 65 (1982); EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE, in KIRK, supra, at 5, 7, 16-19; Walter Bagehot, Intellectual Conservatism,
in KIRK, supra, at 241-42; BENJAMIN DISRAELI, A VINDICATION OF THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, in KIRK, supra, at 223-24; Michael Oakeshott, On Being Conservative, in KIRK, supra,
at 589; John Randolph, Speech Before the Virginia Convention of 1829-90, in KIRK, supra,
at 145. For a particularly intelligent critique of ideology, see HAYEK, supra note 73, at
54-70.
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morality does often tend to have a zealous quality about it.
Moreover, because the exact interests at stake are seldom specified, moral regulation is not easily subjected to the disciplining
influence of law. Those characteristics need not trouble a conservative when the activities in dispute enjoy no constitutional
protection. However, a conservative who views erotic dancing as
a form of "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment
has to be troubled by the boundless quality of the moral justification for regulating speech. In turning against moralists the
conservative disdain for excess and reductionism and the conservative regard for analytical rigor, Justice White challenged his
fellow conservatives to develop an understanding of the First
Amendment that is true to their professed principles.

V.

CONCLUSION

The six opinions I have discussed provide a revealing tableau
of conservative legal analysis. Although none of the judges asserted that as a general matter government lacks the authority
to enforce morality, they differed dramatically over how the
power to enforce morality ,is limited by the First Amendment
and whether nude dancing is a First Amendment activity.
What can one discern from these opinions regarding the likely
future of the freedom of speech in conservative hands? With the
possible exception of Chief Justice Rehnquist, these conservative
judges displayed no inclination to denigrate the freedom of speech,
no inclination to permit speech at the center of First Amendment
concern to be regulated on the basis of political or moral preference alone. Apart from the Chief Justice, those judges who
ruled that nude dancing can be prohibited either found First
Amendment principles inapplicable to such dancing (Easterbrook,226 Scalia 227) or found a basis for upholding the prohibition
independent of the desire to enforce morality (Souter 228). Even
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not say explicitly that morals enforcement would be permissible against art he would consider
serious and valuable, although that may be the implication of his
opinion. 229
With regard to the proper ambit of First Amendment protection, the opinions reveal no conservative consensus. Judge Eas226.
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terbrook drew a sharp distinction between speech and conduct,
placing music and ballet on the speech side of the line but
barroom striptease on the conduct side. The key for him was
whether the activity communicates a genuine message. Justice
White similarly looked to message, but concluded that the striptease was regulated precisely because of its erotic message.
Justice Scalia also drew a distinction between speech and conduct,
but excluded nude dancing from the reach of the First Amendment, not for lack of a message, but for its physical immediacy
and lack of purely representational quality. Both Judge Posner
and Justice Souter analyzed this question of First Amendment
coverage carefully and concluded that despite its crudity nude
dancing in the barroom setting must be considered a form of
expression governed by First Amendment principles. In the years
ahead disagreement will certainly continue within the Court
regarding what activities fall within the scope of First Amendment concern.
Perhaps the most important question concerning the future of
the First Amendment is whether speech that qualifies for protection will be subject to regulation on the basis of general
assertions of danger or social need. The moral justification for
regulating speech may be distinctive in one sense, but it can also
be viewed as a subset of the category of justifications that invoke
unspecific harms (to national security, for example, or to community harmony) and speculative causal scenarios. In the argot
of formulaic legal standards, the question can be framed in terms
of whether the basic concept behind the clear-and-present-danger
test (concrete and specific harm, imminent time frame) will be
replaced by the basic concept behind the compelling-state-interest
test (unspecified measures of harm and causation). On this question the opinions discussed say little, but five of the six judges
went to great lengths to avoid affirming the proposition that
core First Amendment speech can be regulated on the basis of
so unspecific and illimitable a rationale as the desire to enforce
public morality.
Thus, the opinions in Glen Theatre are reassuring in that all
but one of the conservative judges who wrote displayed an
appreciation of how serious a step it would be to permit moral
concerns alone to justify the regulation of speech. On the other
hand, one has to be troubled by the relative ease with which
Justices Scalia and Souter reached the conclusion that the dances
at issue, though concededly nonobscene, were not entitled to the
full measure of First Amendment protection. (Judge Easterbrook
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reached the same conclusion, but recognized the difficulty of the
issue and defended his judgment much more carefully than did
either Justice Scalia or Souter.) It is disturbing also that Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor saw fit to join Chief Justice Rehnquist's
casual, sloppy, yet potentially far-reaching opinion. Given the
high quality of the opinions in the court below, there can be no
excuse for the failure of these Justices to grapple more thoroughly with the important and intriguing question of the proper
scope of a state's authority to enforce morals.
The First Amendment tradition need not suffer and might
even be enriched during a period of conservative trusteeship,
but only if the trustees are as concerned to examine thoughtfully
the implications of their conservative premises as were Judges
Posner and Easterbrook. Conservatism is a philosophy that has
diverse sources and many contemporary strands. Different conservative thinkers place varying emphasis on productivity, stability, continuity, civility, self-reliance, authority, excellence,
liberty, social cohesion, initiative, and prudence. Those values
might be capable of successful integration for the purpose of
informing constitutional interpretation, and so integrated they
might even be reconcilable with the Madisonian project to forestall, confine, and countermand the tyranny of the majority. But
we will learn precious little about such questions if our conservative judges give us opinions so result-oriented, so artificially
circumscribed, so skittish about the power of judicial review, and
so conclusory as those that were produced by the Supreme Court
Justices in the majority in Glen Theatre.

